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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a theoretical study of employment relations between 
hierarchical firms and individual workers. The focus point is on the characteristics 
of the optimal contracts that are implicitiy entered into between the two parties. 
The role of hierarchical firms in the collection of information about the 
worker's abiUty is investigated. It is shown that, when the firm uses this 
information to decide its job assignments/promotions and job signalling exists in the 
labour market, the possibility of quitting results in an upward sloping wage profile 
for the high ability worker, a downward rigid wage profile for the low ability 
worker, and the worker's initial wage being less than his expected average 
productivity. These conclusions remain unchanged when there are more than two 
perceived ability levels, or the firm offers two possible career structures to its 
workers. 
Another function of ihe hierarchical firm is the imposition of supervision to 
prevent its workers from shirking. When this activity is added to the production 
and insurance activities, it is shown that the conclusions of the symmetric-
information implicit labour contract must be modified : invariant wage income 
across states does not necessarily hold and the optimum employment level changes. 
The existence of the supervision activity in the firm also precludes work sharing as 
a way of eliminating involuntary unemployment. 
A hierarchical firm can also be treated as an internal labour market where 
junior/unskilled workers and senior/skilled workers interact. The senior workers 
transmit skills (either general or specific) to junior workers and provide them with 
promotion prospects, and the firm can recruit skilled workers from outside. Under 
these circumstances the conditions under which wages do not equal marginal value 
product of labour are fully investigated. This approach also provides an 
explanation for why a worker's wage profile may diverges from his product profile. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years interpreting employment relations in terms of contractual 
arrangements has become the standard approach in theoretical analyses of labour 
economics. Two forces are behind this development: firstly, the dramatic 
increase in the proportion of employees (as opposed to self-employed workers) in 
the labour force in industrialized economies has produced many complex 
employment relations that need explana t ionand secondly, the newly developed 
contract theory has proved to be a useful framework for analysis. 
Amongst the "stylized facts" of employment arrangements between firms 
and workers, several features are prominent. These are : 
(1) Wage rates and experience/seniority are positively related, but earnings 
increase more with seniority/experience than can be explained by productivity 
increases (Medoff and Abraham (1980)); 
(2) The variance of earnings increases with experience (Mince (1974)); 
(3) Wage rates are mainly attached to jobs rather than to workers^ 
(Williamson, Watchter and Harris (1975)); and 
(4) High-rank positions (associated with high pay) are mainly filled by those 
holding low-rank positions in the same organization. This is the structure of an 
enterprise's internal labour markets documented by Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
In the U. S. the proportion of employees in the labour force increased from 
about 51% in 1900 to 90% in 1978 (Parson (1986) Table 14.1). In Japan 
tiie proportion increased from 39.3% in 1950 to 71.8% in 1980 (Inoki 
(1983) Table 1.7). 
However reports about Japanese firms show that the demarcation of jobs 
among workers is not distinct (Aoki (1988) p. 17). This seems to imply 
that remuneration and fringe benefits are attached more to individual workers 
than to jobs in Japan-
and Osterman (1984). It points to the importance of promotion prospect offered 
by the firm in an employee's career. 
These features are of interest because they indicate, for the most part, that 
employees are not paid a wage in every period equal to their marginal product in that 
period. This indicates that the text-book Walrasian model of market adjustment 
with an implicit auctioneer is, in general, not a fruitful approach to take in the 
analysis of the labour market. There are opportunities for firms and employees to 
make a long-term contract which can improve the welfare of both. Clearly the 
above features reflect the outcome of optimal long-term relations of employment. 
To what extent has economic theory been successful in throwing light on 
these phenomena? Surveying the existing literature, one finds many interesting 
models (see, for example, Harris and Holmstrom (1982), Malcomson (1984), 
Waldman (1984 a), to name a few). However, they are all directed to some of 
these features only. The difficulty comes from the complexity of the problem. 
In the fu-st stage of a contractual relationship, a firm may have limited 
information about the quality of a worker. The worker may also know nothing 
about the task he will undertake. Under these circumstances how can a firm offer 
job security and promotion prospects to attract qualified new workers? Once in the 
position, can an employee's behaviour be constrained so that it is consistent with 
the goal of the firm? How does the threat of dismissal and quitting (by the firm 
and the worker, respectively) affect the wage structure? 
The issues are more complex when one considers the interaction between 
firms and markets. Firms vary in degree of openness to external labour markets. 
Some firms confine entry jobs to a relatively few positions (the so called closed 
intemal labour market), while some have a very high proportion of entry jobs 
relative to all jobs {open intemal labour markets). How does this affect the wage 
structure offered by firms? One may ask a further related question : if a skilled 
worker's mobility in a market is not perfect (due to transaction costs that arise from 
imperfect information, specific human capital, etc), what does his wage profile 
look like, compared to his productivity profile? 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide some partial explanations of the 
features and the problems listed above. Obviously, the list is not exhaustive. For 
example, one may try to explain the phenomena that wage rates climb with firm 
size (Oi (1986) Table 1), or that the distribution of earnings is skewed to the right 
relative to the distribution of ability. Due to limitations of time and space this thesis 
concentrates on the features of optimal contracts between firms and individual 
workers only. The roles played by other factors, such as trade unions or the 
government, on the outcome of employment relations are ignored. Furthermore, 
to make the study more realistic, the firm under investigation is assumed to be a 
hierarchical one where promotion prospects, supervision, and training are 
allowed. This extension gives us some useful insight. 
The present study is purely theoretical. It begins with a survey of the 
theories of employment contracts. The survey covers what in the author's opinion 
are the three main branches of analysis in this area : the agency theory, the implicit 
contract model, and the models concerned with internal hierarchies. 
Chapter III specifies a two-period model where an individual's ability is the 
determinant of job promotion in a firm. The worker's ability is unknown to both 
the firm and himself at the hiring stage. After the first period, the firm leams about 
an individual's ability and uses it to determine his second-period job assignment. 
In this second stage outside firms can get perfect information about a worker's 
ability through the job position he takes. The possibility of quitting means that the 
worker's wage must be greater than or equal to his outside perceived value. 
However, the existence of promotion prospects implies there is room for the firm 
to manipulate the optimal wage profile offered to its workers. It is further shown 
that, in joining a hierarchical firm, promotion prospects are not the only factor 
affecting a worker's welfare, initial job assignment also plays an important role in 
determining it. 
Shirking is a serious problem for firms. In Chapter IV a model where the 
firm performs not only the activities of production and insurance as discussed in the 
implicit contract theory, but also the activity of supervision to prevent the workers 
from shirking is set up. To concentrate the study on the role of supervision the 
possibility of job promotion is assumed away by considering the simple hierarchical 
firm which includes only two levels : the owner and the workers. Clearly it is a 
modification of the symmetric-information implicit contract model developed by 
Azariadis (1975) and Bailey (1974), The analysis focuses on die possibility of 
layoffs and the stability of wage income as the outcomes of optimal employment 
contracts. The effectiveness of work sharing which is often suggested in the 
economics literature as a means of avoiding involuntary unemployment is also 
discussed under these circumstances. 
Chapter V examines a firm which forms its internal labour market (ILM). 
The firm is treated as a place which offers training, general or specific, to its 
common/junior workers who constitute a source of its senior/skilled workers. A 
two-period model is built where a junior worker accepts training in the firm in the 
first period and may be promoted to a senior status in the second period. The firm 
can recruit skilled workers from outside with some mobility and adjustment costs. 
Therefore it is tiie open ILM. The study focuses on the roles tiiat training, 
promotion prospects and recruiting costs play in the interaction of a worker's wage 
profile and his productivity profile. The analysis is then extended to the worker's 
life-time career and shows that waiting for promotion is also an important element in 
determining tiie worker's wage profile. 
The conclusions of the analysis are presented in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT : A SURVEY 
1. Introduction 
Economists have long recognized that labour is different from non-
human factors. Oi (1986) oudines five peculiarities of labour identified by Alfred 
Marshall as 
"the worker sells his work but retains property in himself, the 
seller of labour delivers it himself, labour is perishable, sellers 
of it are often at disadvantage in bargaining, and it takes a 
great length of time from providing additional supplies of special 
abilities." (p.2). 
In developed economies, as the proportion of employed workers in the 
labour force has increased rapidly from the mm of the century, the employment 
relationship between employers and employees has become particularly significant. 
This is especially true for big enterprises. With a large number of employees, the 
efficiency of allocating and utilizing its human capital resources (the so called 
personnel policy) is one of the firm's most important concerns. Various explicit 
and implicit contracts have emerged attempting to define and regulate the 
employment relationship. Examples include the incentive reward schemes 
discussed in the principal-agent problems and the arrangement of wage profiles and 
severance pay to reduce the employees' turnover (labour turnover models). Also, 
there are contracts not written, but tacidy understood by both the firm and the 
employees. Examples are firms' investments in firm-specific training, their tacit 
commitment to life-time employment (that there will be no layoffs except under 
extreme circumstances), promotions, and the regularity of wage income received 
by the worker. There is no doubt that recent progress in the theory of contracts 
(see the survey articles by Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Rosen (1985) and 
MacDonald (1984)) enables economists to understand many employment 
relationships which can not be explained by the standard theory of perfectly 
competitive markets. 
Another strand of literature in employment relations, the internal hierarchy, 
is concerned with organizational aspects. Initiated by doubts that markets can 
effectively economize the transaction cost associated with spot market contracting 
and/or contingent claims contracting when there are job idiosyncrasies, this 
research gives an explanation of the emergence of internal labour markets. A prime 
source of transaction costs is the collection of information : the employee may 
acquire and hold task-specific knowledge or job-specific skills which are valuable to 
the firm; or the firm may accumulate information about an employee's ability/talent 
which is important in matching him with jobs properly. Therefore one of the 
functions of internal hierarchies is to collect information about job and personal 
characteristics. Another function provided by the internal hierarchy is its ability to 
prevent opportunism (which also arises from incomplete information): a worker 
may shirk or become a free-rider in team production. Various measures are 
adopted in hierarchical firms to solve the conflict in goals between the firm and the 
workers arising from this situation. 
These two strands of analyses are not independent, rather they are 
complementary, because the internal hierarchy can be treated as a nexus of 
contracts. The many models developed in the literature of agency theory can be 
categorised as a group dealing with two-level hierarchical firms where the principal 
is formed by the owners and the managers as a group, while workers are the agent. 
Extending the two-level model to more levels is natural, but not straightforward. 
Consider a three-level hierarchy which includes the owner, the supervisor, and the 
worker. The owner hires the supervisor to collect information about the state of 
productivity which, together with the worker's effort, determines the realized 
profit. Because of the possibility of side-contracting (coalition) between the 
supervisor and the worker, in addition to the usual incentive compatibility and 
individual rationality constraints, new constraints must be introduced in the 
contract. Under these circumstances the outcome of the optimal contract has 
properties significantly different from those under two-level hierarchies. MacLeod 
and Malcomson (1988) provide another direction of integration. The principal-
agent model is set in the internal hierarchy where promotions in ranks are allowed. 
This model gives some explanations on the observed structures of the wage profile 
and the organization of the firm. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the recent 
development in employment contracts. As a branch of the theory of the firm, a 
young and still developing field which has attracted great attention in recent years, 
there are a large number of related models each having its own perspective. ^  A 
comprehensive and chronological survey seems neither necessary nor economical. 
Instead, this chapter focuses on three related areas only : agency theory, implicit 
labour contract theory, and models concerned with internal hierarchy.^ Each of 
these emphasizes different points. However, they all recognize the distorting 
effects of asymmetric information on the determination of employment relations. 
Section 2 of this chapter covers the agency theory. It is the information possessed 
by the employee about his work effort and/or his characteristics (such as his ability, 
his knowledge about the state of the world), which is unknown to the firm that 
causes problems. In Section 3 the impHcit labour contract model is introduced. In 
this area it is the reliability of the information about the state of the world held by the 
firm that affects the optimal employment "contract" (wage package and separation 
1 See Holmstrom and Tirole (1987) for a classic illustration in the recent 
development in the theory of the firm. 
2 An important area, the influences of union behaviour on employment 
relations, is ignored here. See McDonald and Solow (1981) and the 
survey article of Farber (1986) on this aspect. 
of the relation). Attention is then turned to a brief discussion of the implications of 
specific human capital and labour turnover on employment relations. Formally 
they do not belong to the implicit labour contract theory. However the contracts 
designed there are a kind of implicit agreement understood by relevant parties so 
that the cost resulting from job separations is minimized. The role of internal 
hierarchies will be discussed in Section 4. Two functions performed by the 
internal hierarchy, which are related to the topic are considered. One is 
supervision, the other is the collection of information and job assignments. They 
provide some understanding about the way hierarchical firms deal with their 
employees. 
2. The Agency Theory 
An agency relationship is said to exist between two (or more) parties when 
one, called the agent, acts on behalf of another, called the principal. In the 
analysis of employment relations the owner of the firm can be treated as the 
principal and the hired manager as the agent; or the owner and the manager can be 
grouped together and treated as the principal, and the hired worker is then the 
agent For ease of exposition the second way is considered.^ The worker is 
hired by the principal to perform the same job each period (hence job assignment or 
matching the worker with the job is ignored). The owner wants to design a 
compensation package ex ante to elicit from the worker an appropriate effort level 
or the information about his ability. The firm's ex post revenue is assumed to be a 
function of two factors : (1) tiie worker's effort and ability, and (2) some 
exogenous variables, such as market demand. Three basic problems are raised in 
Models of managerial compensation contracts discuss the first treatment. 
They are complex, because the causality of firm performance and 
management compensation must be identified, and this is of concem to 
financial aspects of the firm, see Darrough and Stoughton (1986) and 
Journal of Accounting and Economics^\o\. 7, (1985). 
the agent models. First, under what conditions will the owner of the firm offer the 
worker a constant wage insulated against the disturbances caused by fluctuations in 
exogenous variables? (i. e. the owner serves as a residual claimant). Second, if 
observation of the worker's effort is so costly that it does not pay to do so, then the 
owner can only make probabilistic inference about it through realized revenues. 
How does this affect the wage? Finally, if the worker has the information about 
his ability (high ability indicates high productivity), what are the properties of the 
wage package designed to motivate the worker to reveal this? The following 
analyses try to answer these questions. 
2.1 The Formulation 
We begin by setting out the basic model which will be used through the rest 
of the section. This model captures the essence of the thrust made by Holmstrom 
(1979) and Harris and Raviv (1979). It is assumed that the principal has a 
Neumann-Morgenstem (N-M) utility function U(7c), where TC = x - w, x is 
the revenue from the production, and w is the wage paid to the worker. U has 
the property that U' > 0, U" < 0, so risk loving is ruled out. The worker has 
a N-M utility function v(w, e), where e is his work effort which causes 
disutility to him. For simplicity assume that v is separable in w and e , i. e. 
v(w, e) = v(w) - c(e) with v ^ > 0, v^w < 0; Ce > 0, Cgg > 0. The 
worker's effort, e , his ability, a , and the state of the world, 0 , jointly 
determine a verifiable outcome (revenue): 
X = x(e, a, 0 ) . (1) 
The state of the world is assumed to be drawn from a distribution G, which is 
known by both parties. Suppose there are N possible states of the world, we 
denote the probability of 0i as 
Pi = p(ei), with XiPi = 1, i = l , 2 , . . . , N. 
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The worker chooses his effon before the realization of 9. Depending on 
various assumptions about the observability of e (or 9) and the worker's 
knowledge about his ability, different agency models result. 
22 Optimal Risk-sharing 
If the principal can observe e , then given the worker's ability, he can 
infer 0 from the realized outcome x through equation ( l )^ The principal's 
problem is to construct a reward scheme which takes outcomes (which are now 
determined by 6i) into payments for the agent. Let wj = w(9i) denote the 
wage paid to the worker if state i occurs. The principal chooses wj to maximize 
his expected utility: 
l i Pi U(7ri) (2) 
where K[ = x{ - wj, subject to the participation constraint that the worker's 
expected utility of joining the firm is not less than a minimum expected utility level, 
vo^ 
l i Pi [ v(wi) - c(e) ] > Vo (3) 
where e is a given work effort level which is agreed by botii parties and will be 
performed by the agent (because it is observable). 
Let B be the multiplier on (3), then the first-order conditions are (the 
apostrophe represents differentiation): 
- Pi U'(7Ui) + B Pi v'(wi) = 0 i = 1, 2,..., N. • (4) 
Solving tills yields 
6 = U'(7ti)/v'(wi) (5) 
If two states are taken, then (5) implies (since B is a constant) 
U'(7Ui) / U'(7Cj) = v'(wi)/v'(wj) (6) 
4 If the state of the world is observable, then work effort is observable too. 
However, it is of little interest in tiie analysis. 
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This is the first-best optimal risk-sharing rule that the principal and the agent's 
marginal rates of substitution of contingent income between any two states are 
equal. 
If the principal is risk-neutral, his utility function is linear in income, and 
can be set as U(7ii) = (= x[ - w j ) . Under this situation the first-order 
condition (4) becomes 
-P i + Bpiv ' (wi ) = 0 
thus 
B = l / v ' ( w i ) 
which implies 
v ' ( w i ) / v ' ( w j ) = 1 f o r i ^ j . (7) 
Suppose the agent is risk-averse, then strict concavity of v indicates wj = wj 
from (7), i. e. the wage is not affected by the state of the world. Thus if the agent 
is risk-averse and the principal is risk-neutral, then the former will get a wage 
income with certainty, independent of 0 , and the latter will receive the residual, 
Xi - Wi. 
This result reflects Frank Knight's view that the entrepreneur bears the risk 
and serves as a residual income recipient. Assuming the principal (the 
owner/manager) is risk-neutral seems acceptable because he can shift some of the 
risks to the capital market and manage portfolio diversifications. As for the 
worker, because most of his wealth is human capital which cannot be diversified 
through holding different jobs, it seems reasonable to assume that he is risk-averse. 
2.3 The Basic Moral Hazard Model 
If work effort (or the state of the world) is not observable to the principal, 
then the above problem must be changed by adding an incentive constraint that 
induces the employee to work at an optimal effort. For simplicity, assume that the 
12 
worker can either work hard, H , or be lazy, L ; and assume that the principal is 
risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. 
Since the agent's effort is not observed by the principal, the way the 
worker's effort influences the outcome must first be formulated. One way of 
tackling it is to make the probability of the outcome a function of the worker's 
effort. Let pi(e) be the (conditional) probability that state / occurs, given that 
effort level is e . Clearly l i pi(e) = 1 must hold for every e . The problem 
is to set wj so that the agent is motivated to choose the desired effort which 
maximizes the principal's expected income. In the model there are only two 
possible effort levels, therefore the analysis examines the case where hard work, 
e = en is optimal from the principal's point of view. 
The principal's objective function is to maximize 
Si pi(eH) TCj (8) 
where TCj = x^  - wj, subject to the following participation constraint 
l i pi(eH) v(wi) - c(eH) > Vq. (9) 
There is still an incentive constraint that under the reward scheme the worker will 
select to work hard, rather than being lazy : 
l i pi(eH) v(wi) - c(eH) > l i Pi(eL) v(wi) - CCCL) (10) 
The above constraint assures that it is hard work, ejj , that is preferred by the 
agent. 
Let 6 and jj, be the multipliers attached to constraints (9) and (10), 
respectively. The first-order conditions of the problem are : 
-pi(eH) + Bpi(eH) v'(wi) + |i[pi(eH) - Pi(eL) ] v'(wi) = 0 
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After rearranging, the above optimal condition implies^ 
1 / v'(wi) = S + [ 1 - Pi(eL)/pi(eH) ]. (11) 
What is contained in the above condition? First, if |j. = 0, then from 
(11) we know wj = wj, which is the first-best sharing rule that the risk-neutral 
party offers guaranteed income to the risk-averse party. But ±e incentive 
constraint (10) will be violated if the invariant wage is applied to it (because CH 
> ejJ). Therefore |i > 0 must hold. Now condition (11) indicates that the 
wage will vary with the outcome through the likehood ratio Pi(eL) / Pi(eH). Hence 
risk-sharing is not Pareto-efficient and is distorted by the need to consider the 
incentive effects on the agent's choice (of his behaviour). 
The meaning of the likehood ratio can be understood in terms of a posterior 
probability derived from updating a prior probability on ej^ .*^  Suppose the 
principal believes that the agent works hard, but he wants to infer it from the 
outcome. Let s denote the prior probability that effort level is high, and 5 * the 
5 Note that, since it is assumed that there are only two effort levels and en is 
chosen, e is not a decision variable here. If effort level is a continuous 
variable, then the objective is to maximize the following problem with 
respect to wi and e : 
l i Pi(e) (xi - Wi) (1) 
subject to 
l i Pi(e) v(wi) - c(e) > 0 (2) 
and (the apostrophe represents differentiation) 
l i P i ' ( e ) v ( w i ) - c ' ( e ) = 0 . ( 3 ) 
The second constraint is the first-order condition ensuing that the work effort 
is at the optimal level (see Holmstrom (1979) on the conditions under 
which (3) is a valid specification). The optimal sharing rule of the above 
constrained problem is 
l /v ' (wi ) = & + ^ [Pi '(e)/Pi(e)] for all i. 
which is similar to (11) in tiie text 
6 The following explanation comes from Hart and Holmstrom (1987). 
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corresponding posterior probability, given that the outcome \ [ is observed, then 
by Bayes' rule 
Si* = s pi(eH) / [ s pi(eH) + (1 - s) pi(eL) ] 
which implies 
Pi(eL)/Pi(eH) = s(si* - l ) / s i * ( s - 1). 
Substituting into (11) yields 
l / v ' ( w i ) = S + n [(Si* - s ) / s i * ( l - s)] ( I D 
Thus the agent is punished for outcomes that revise the belief about his effort down 
(si* < s), or is rewarded for outcomes that revise the belief about his effort up 
(Si* > s). 
Finally, note that if one writes wi = WQ + bj, where WQ is the basic 
wage paid to the worker (for the low work effort performed), then bi is the bonus 
received if the worker is confirmed to have worked hard However, there is no 
guarantee that at an optimum the wage is a linear function of the outcome, x (i. e. 
piece rates). If the assumption that the likehood ratio is monotone in the outcome is 
added, the conclusion that the wage is increasing in x results^ 
Several advances have been made from the basic moral hazard model. One 
is to consider the multi-agent situation. The existence of many agents allows the 
firm to adopt compensation schemes in terms of relative performance, that is, 
rewards based on the ordinal positions, not on the absolute size, of a worker's 
outputs (Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)). Remember that one possible source of 
difficulties in measuring an individual's work effort comes from the unobservability 
The property of the monotone likehood ratio is that the ratio pi(eL) / Pi(eH) is 
monotone in x, increasing if CL > CH and decreasing otherwise (see 
Milgrom (1981)). Since eL cannot be greater than en, this property 
assures that the likehood ratio is decreasing in x. Therefore from condition 
(11), as long as the worker is risk-averse (i. e. v"(wi) < 0), wages 
increase as x increases. 
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of the state of nature. Wage pay in terms of rank order can eliminate the 
disturbance resulting from common changes in the environment, and would be 
preferred by the agent. Another extension is to build long-term relationships 
between the principal and the agent (Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985)). In 
these models the agent's performances on the current period as well as on the prior 
periods will decide his present compensation. 
2.4 The Basic Adverse Selection Model 
Another type of principal-agent problem arises from the situation that the 
worker possesses some information which, if known by the principal, would 
influence the principal's choice of action that might affect the agent's welfare. A 
typical example in the job market is that an individual with low ability may 
misrepresent this information and claim that he is qualified for a job. Many 
screening mechanisms exist in the market to reduce the cost of adverse selection, 
for example, using years of education as a signal of an applicant's ability (Spence 
(1973)), and testing before the worker is formally employed (Guasch and Weiss 
(1981), Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987)). 
Models of signalling and testing involve many characteristics of optimal 
contracts (the wages offered to different types of workers, the cost of adopting 
testing, pooling equilibrium versus separating equilibrium, etc). In what follows 
two models of optimal wage contracts under adverse selection are presented. The 
first model is called "talent search" where the object is to employ one particular type 
of worker from a group of workers. The second model is a "sorting" one : 
different contracts are offered to different types of workers, all of whom are 
employed by the fmn. 
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A Talent Search Model (Hagerty and Siegel (1988)) 
The assumptions that the output is a function of the worker's effort, ability 
and the state of the world are maintained here, and there are N possible outputs 
xj, i = 1,.„N. Now let the agent's work effort be given so that the role of the 
agent's ability can be concentrated on. We redefine pi(a) as the probability that x[ 
occurs given the employee's ability is a, which can be either a^ (high ability) or 
aL (low ability). Since the worker has information about his ability (which is not 
necessarily precise), it is reasonable to assume that the high ability worker' 
reservation utility, vpj, is greater than that of the low ability worker, vl . 
Formally, set vjj = v l + c(aH), where c(aH) > 0 is the rent attributed to the 
high ability worker for his high productivity. 
For analytical interest the case where the principal wants to hire high ability 
workers is investigated. His problem is to maximize 
l i pi(aH) (xi - wi). (12) 
The participation constraint of the high ability worker is 
l i pi(aH) v(wi) >VH. (13) 
There is still a constraint required to prevent low ability workers from applying for 
the job, i. e. his expected utility of joining the firm cannot be greater than his 
reservation utility: 
l i Pi(aL) v(wi) < Vl 
which implies 
vh - c(aH) > l i Pi(aL) v(wi) 
Using constraint (13) the above "non-participation constraint" of the low 
ability workers can be formulated as 
l i Pi(aH) v(wi) - c(aH) ^ l i Pi(aL) v(wi) (14) 
The problem is now to maximize (12) subject to (13) and (14). Comparing this 
with the problem of the basic moral hazard model reveals that they are aknost the 
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same. Therefore the first-order conditions developed there, (11), are applicable. 
Rewriting gives 
l /v ' (wi ) = 8 + ^ [1 - pi(aL)/pi(aH)] 
where 6 and |j. are the multipliers on constraints (13) and (14), respectively. 
Using the argument analogous to the moral hazard problem it can be concluded that 
the worker's wage is not invariant across states. 
A second class of models are known as the "sorting models" or 
"non-linear pricing models". These types of models have a variety of applications, 
ranging from optimal income tax (Mirrlees (1971)) to price discrimination 
(Cooper (1984)). 
A Sorting Model 
In what follows, an informal version of a sorting model is presented (see 
the Appendix for a more rigorous treatment). There are two types of workers, 
those with high ability (a = a^) and those with low ability (a = aL). The 
proportion of workers having low ability is r . Output is related to ability and 
effort level e : 
X = ae. (15) 
Each worker has the utility function: 
U(w, e) = u(w) - v(e) 
where w denotes wage income, and it is assumed that u(0) = 0, u'(w) > 0, 
u"(w) < 0, v'(e) > 0, v"(e) > 0 and v(0) = 0. 
Inverting the production function (15) produces 
e = x / a 
For any given pair (x, w), the utility of a type-H agent is 
U h = u(w) - v( x / a n ) (16') 
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and for the type-L agent, 
U l = u(w) - v( x / a L ) . (16") 
It is easy to see that in the (x, w) space, the indifference curves of each 
agent are convex, and that type-L agents have steeper indifference curves (see 
Figure 1). For simplicity assume that the reservation levels of utility are the same 
(= UQ = 0) for both types of agents (this assumption is for simplicity and can be 
relaxed without much difficulty). 
Before analysing the optimal contract under adverse selection, it is 
instructive to consider the "first best" case, i. e. what the principal would do if he 
can tell, prior to offering a contract, which type a worker is. Take the simplest 
case where the principal is risk-neutral so that his utility is simply his net profit, 
X - w. Facing a type-H worker, he seeks to maximize (notice that output is not 
affected by the state of the world): 
xh - WH 
subject to the participation constraint: 
U(WH) - V( X N / A N ) > U Q 
This yields the first-best efficiency condition that the indifference curve of the agent 
is tangent to the indifference curve of the principal: 
V'( XH/an ) ( l / a H ) / u ' ( w H ) = 1 (17) 
Similarly, facing a type-L worker, the first-best efficiency condition is 
V ' ( X L / A L ) ( L / A L ) / U ' ( W L ) = 1 ( 1 8 ) 
Equations (17) and (18) yield two combinations, (XH, WH) and WL) 
which are points a and b in Figure 2, respectively. Note that all workers are 
pressed down to their respective reservation utility levels (UQ = 0). 
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We now intrcxiuce adverse selection. Suppose a type-H worker can 
disguise himself as a type-L worker. Then, faced with the above two alternative 
output-wage packages, this worker would pretend that he is a type-L worker, thus 
achieving a higher utility U^ (= K > 0, as illustrated in figure 2, where K is 
some positive number). Therefore, under asymmetric information, such that the 
agent can hide his characteristics, the first-best point (Xfj, w^) is not incentive 
compatible and will not be chosen by type-H workers. 
Clearly it would be in the interest of the principal to prevent 
misrepresentation by type-H workers. Consider an alternative output-wage 
package (x^, wjj) located on the Ufj = K curve, such that the slope of the 
curve at that point is unity. A type-H worker would be indifferent between (x^, 
WH) and (xjj, w^) and therefore he can be made to choose the former by offering 
him a small bribe (say one cent). The point (xjj, w^) is a Pareto improvement 
over (xjj, WH) for type-H workers and the principal. Thus the offer of two 
alternative packages (XL, WJJ ^ ^ (^H' ^H) ^^ workers will ensure that 
workers self select and tell the truth. 
The next step is to show that the principal can do better by departing from 
the above menu (XL, WJJ, (X^, W^). Consider a small displacement from (XL, 
WL) to (XL*, WL*), a point to the south-west of (XL, WL) and on the UL = 0 
curve. Since the slope at (XL, WL) is unity, this displacement will reduce XL 
a small amount, d and WL by approximately d : the loss to the principal is 
therefore approximately zero. The benefit to the principal is that he can now make 
type-H workers choose an output-wage package much more favourable to him : 
this is point c on the lower indifference curve UH = K* (< K), which passes 
through (xl*, WL*), and its slope at the point (x^*, wjj*) is unity. Thus 
output extracted from each type-H worker increases from x^ to x^* while the 
wage package is reduced, from w^ to wj^*. 
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It is clear that the second-best wage contract implies a distortion : at (XL*, 
WL*) the first-best rule (18) no longer holds. The adverse selection model 
presented above illustrates the "revelation principle": efficient contracts have the 
property that agents are induced to tell the truth, and there are no gains for them to 
pretend to have characteristics which are not theirs. This, of course, does not 
mean that an efficient contract must always treat different types of agents differently 
: it is possible to have a "pooling equilibrium" where several agent types are 
lumped together. It remains true, however, that in an efficient arrangement, 
agents have no incentive to lie. 
The above talent search model can be extended to many periods, and it 
can be shown that, in an efficient contract, a worker's current compensation 
depends on his performances of the current period as well as the early periods.^ 
This is consistent with the observation that if an employee is found to be unsuitable 
for a job, he may be reassigned to other jobs (associated with changes in wages). 
Of course this does not mean the above incentive scheme is applicable to all 
circumstances. In some important managerial jobs, screening rather than self-
selection is adopted. The firm would rather spend several months in selecting 
qualified persons, from inside or outside the firm, to fill these jobs. Nevertheless 
one can easily find many characteristics of the managerial compensation contracts 
(bonuses, stock options, etc) which try to bring the manager's interest into line 
with those of the stockholders (Raviv (1985)). 
The multi-period model under adverse selection is more complex than that 
under moral hazard. The information about the employee's ability may be 
transmitted to the market (through job assignment), and outside firms may 
try to hire the able worker away. This consideration will affect the 
compensation structure as will be seen in the discussion in section 4. 
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3. The Implicit Labour Contract 
The implicit labour contract model developed by Azariadis (1975) and 
Baily (1974) attempts to explain long-term employment relationships between 
firms and workers. It views the allocation of labour services not in a sequential 
spot exchange which is subject to random, publicly observed fluctuations, but in a 
smooth way that the firm offers wage and employment insurance to its risk-averse 
workers. In this section this model is briefly described and its implications for the 
determination of wages and employment illustrated. 
2.1 The Basic Framework 
Imagine a single firm that has a long-term relationship with a given pool of 
n identical workers. The model, however, is static in that it essentially involves 
two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0 die contract is signed, employment and production 
occur at date 1. In the interim perhaps the workers receive training (so there is a 
lock-in effect for both parties). The firm's date 1 revenue is uncertain. It is 
affected by the state of nature, s . For simplicity, assume diat there are only two 
states : state one (the good state) and state two (the bad state). The probability of 
state one occurring is s j and of state two S2 (= 1 - sj). At this stage the 
symmetric information situation is considered in the sense that both the firm and the 
workers are able to observe the realization of s . Corresponding to the state of 
nature there is a certain output price, p j (for state one) or p2 (for state two), 
which is taken as given by the firm. Thus the firm is assumed to be in a 
competitive output market. 
A contract wiU specify a number of workers nj (< n) who should work in 
state I , and a payment wj to each of those employed. Since there are only two 
states, we assume that the firm will employ all n workers if state 1 occurs, i. e. 
n j = n. On the other hand it may want to employ only a portion of n if the bad 
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state occurs, so n2 < n. The production technology is described by the standard 
production function: 
xi = f(ni), f > 0, f < 0, f(0) = 0. (19) 
The firm is assumed to be risk-neutral. Its objective is therefore to 
maximize its expected income : 
E(jr) = si (pi XI - wi ni) + S2 (P2 X2 - W2 n2). (20) 
A worker has a Neumann-Morgenstem utility function v(w, /) , where w 
is the wage payment received from the firm, / is leisure. Assume v ^ > 0, v/ 
> 0, and v ^ ^ < 0 i. e. he is risk-averse. To simplify the analysis it is useful 
to assume that work is indivisible, so leisure is either 0 or 1. With this we can 
redefine the utility function : 
v(w, / ) = v(w, 0) = U(w) if he works 
= v(0, l) = U(z) if he is laid off 
where z can be thought as the sum of unemployment benefits from an economy-
wide fund and the valuation of increased leisure from unemployment. 
The expected utility for the worker is 
s iU(wi ) -H S2[(n2/n)U(w2) + (1 - n2 /n )U(z) ] . (21) 
The firm maximizes (20) with respect to wj , W2 as well as n2, subject to the 
constraint that the worker's expected utility (21) is not less than a competitive 
expected level Uq, and that the retention ratio of the worker in state two, n2 / n, 
is not greater than 1. Construct the Lagrangean : 
£ = SI (pi XI - wi n) -t- S2 (P2 - W2 n2) + B { s j U(wi) 
-h S2 [ (n2 / n) U(w2) + (1 - n2 / n) U(z) ] - Uq } + ^ (1 - n2 / n) 
where B and |i are the multipliers. 
The first-order conditions are 
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w j : - si n + Bs i U ' (wi ) = 0 (22) 
W2: - S2n2 + 6 S2 (n2 / n) U'(w2) = 0 (23) 
"2= S2 [ P2 f (n2) - W2 ] + 6 S2 [ U(w2) - U(z) ] / n - n = 0 (24) 
plus the complementary slackness condition 
(1 - n 2 / n ) = 0, and ^ > 0. (25) 
Equations (22) and (23) together imply 
6 = n / U ' ( w i ) = n / U ' ( w 2 ) (26) 
which indicates that w^ = W2, i. e. the worker's wage income is state-invariant. 
This reflects nothing but the optimal risk-sharing rule discussed in Section 2.2 that 
the risk-neutral party offers insurance to the risk-averse party. 
Now we investigate the possibility of layoffs. Using (26) in (24), then 
rearranging yields (since the optimal wage is invariant across states the subscript is 
deleted and use w to denote it): 
H = n S2 { P2 f (n2) - w + [ U(w) - U(z) ] / U'(w) }. (27) 
From condition (25) the necessary condition for layoffs to occur ( n 2 / n < 1) is 
|j, = 0, which reaches at the point that 
w = p2 f'(n2) + [U(w) - U ( z ) ] / U ' ( w ) (28) 
Several points can be inferred from condition (28). First, it indicates that layoffs 
are possible. Moreover, since usually z < w (no worker will contract his 
labour if w < z ), the workers who are laid off in bad times would have a lower 
utility level than those who remain hired. There are involuntary layoffs 
(unemployment) in an ex post sense. Secondly, the wage differs from the 
marginal value product of labour. A risk premium, [ U(w) -U(z) ] / U'(w), must 
be paid to the worker to compensate him for an increase in the probability of 
unemployment, if the firm wishes to lay off some workers in the adverse state of 
nature. It can be shown that the size of the premium is determined by the worker's 
degree of risk-aversion and his valuation of the benefit derivable from 
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unemployment, z : 9 
[U(w) - U ( z ) ] / U ' ( w ) = (w - z) + (w - z)2 A / 2 (29) 
where A = - U"(w) / U'(w) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-
aversion. Substittiting (29) into (28) and rearranging we get another form of the 
necessary condition for layoffs to occur: 
P2f '(N2) = z - (w - Z ) 2 A / 2 (28') 
Given an output price and production technology, this says that layoffs are less 
likely to occur the more risk-averse workers are; and z, the outside opportunity a 
worker has, must be large enough to induce layoffs, and high values of z make 
layoffs more likely to occur. 
The first result stated above will change if the firm is allowed to pay 
unemployment compensation direcdy to the worker. To see this, suppose a 
redundancy payment, r, is paid to the laid-off worker. Then it should be treated 
as a decision variable of the firm. The firm's expected utility (income) is 
s i (pi XI - wi n) + S2 [ P2 X2 - n2 W2 - (n - n2) r ] 
while the expected utility for the worker is changed into 
s i U ( w i ) + S 2 [ ( n 2 / n ) U ( w 2 ) + (1 - n 2 / n ) U ( z + r) ] 
It is not difficult to show that the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
condition: 
n / U ' ( w i ) = n / U ' ( w 2 ) = n / U ' ( z + r) (30) 
and the condition for layoffs to occur is 
W2 - r = P 2 f ( n 2 ) + [ U(w2) - U(z + r ) ] / U ' ( w 2 ) (31) 
Expanding U(z) in a Taylor series about w and ignoring terms of order 
higher than second yields 
U(z) = U(w) + (z - w) U'(w) + (z - w)2 U"(w) /2 . 
Rearranging yields 
[U(w) - U ( z ) ] / U ' ( w ) = (w - z) + (w - z)2 A / 2 
where A = - U " ( w ) / U ' ( w ) > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute 
risk-aversion. 
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Condition (30) indicates that the firm should set w j = W2 = z + r (= w*). 
That is, the worker not only bears no risk, but also is indifferent between working 
at the going wage, w*, or being laid off. Involuntary layoffs in an ex post sense 
would be precluded Therefore the model fails to explain "non-Walrasian" 
unemployment as long as redundancy pay is permitted JO As to condition (31), 
it implies (since the bracketed term on the right-hand-side is zero) 
w* - r = p2 f'(n2) (31') 
which determines the optimal employment level in the adverse state of nature : n2 
should be set at the point where the marginal value product of labour equals its net 
wage cost, w* - r. 
In order to explain "non-Walrasian" unemployment a number of economists 
consider the situation where firms have better information about the state of the 
world than workers. This is tiie asymmetric-information case and will be 
discussed in the next section. 
32 Asymmetric Information 
In this section the assumption that there are only two possible states : the 
good state where pi occurs, and the bad state where P2 occurs is maintained. 
For analytical purposes the firm is allowed to make redundancy payments, r , to 
laid-off workers. Suppose now only the firm can observe the realization of the 
state of nature, so which of pj or P2 occurs is not observable to the workers at 
date 1. One problem arises. Under what conditions will the firm find it profitable 
to distort the information about the true state of nature? To answer this question 
consider first tiie case in which the firm is risk-neutral and the worker is risk-
averse. In these situations the firm serves as the residual claimant (see condition 
10 The same conclusion can be made if work-sharing is possible (i. e. persons 
and hours are perfect substitutes in production and the utility loss firom such 
nonconvexities as set-up costs of going to work are negligible). 
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(30)). The only way in which lying about the state of nature could change the 
wage payment is through changes in the employment status of the worker. But 
there is no reason for the firm to deviate its employment from that implied by the 
marginal efficiency condition (31'). Therefore if the firm is risk-neutral, 
employment under asymmetric information (about the state of nature) is the same 
as that under symmetric information. 
Now examine the case where both the firm and the worker are risk- averse. 
Since the firm is risk-averse, it would like its workers to take a wage cut in the bad 
state (i. e. wage variability). There is the moral hazard problem on the principal's 
side : if only the firm can observe the state of the world and the contract says that 
wages can be cut in bad times, then it is always in the firm's interest to claim that 
the time is bad. To convince the workers that the state of the world is really bad, 
wages must depend on variables which are observable to both the firm and the 
workers. A candidate variable, suitable for this purpose, is employment within 
the firm. Under these circumstances the firm cannot reduce total wages unless it 
reduces employment simultaneously, therefore "as a consequence, in bad states, 
employment will fall by more than it should firom an efficiency point of view, 
simply because this is the only way the firm can get wages down," (Hart (1983), 
p.3).ii 
In general the implicit labour contracting models describe situations in which 
there are incomplete risk markets and layoffs are the primary vehicle for inducing 
separation. 
11 Employment under asymmetric information is not necessary less than the 
efficient level. Overemployment is possible, depending on the specification 
of worker's utility function (as work hours are added), see Azariadis and 
Stiglitz (1983). 
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3 J The Labour Turnover Model and Firm-specific Human Capital 
The labour turnover model differs from ±e implicit contracting model in two 
aspects: (1) it describes siaiations in which separation is initiated by wor/ter^ 
(quitting the job), rather than dismissals by firms; and (2) the relevant 
information considered is the knowledge owned by workers about their quit rates at 
the stage of hiring (not the knowledge about the state of the world owned by 
firms). In this model firms attempt to design a wage policy as a screening device in 
order to separate high quitters from low quitters so that turnover costs, which 
include hiring costs and training expenses, are minimized (Salop and Salop 
(1976), Nickell(1976), Stiglitz (1974)). This results in the possibility of a two-
tier wage system : steep wage profiles offered to low quitters and flat wage profiles 
offered to high quitters. A worker selecting the steep wage profile reveals his 
intention of staying with the firm for some time after the training and will receive 
wages greater than his net marginal product of labour (after the deduction of the 
periodic rent of turnover costs), if he does so. If he quits for whatever reasons, 
he is penalised as his wage is less than his marginal product of labour during the 
training period 
The specific human capital theory provides another explanation on the 
existence of a wedge between the wage and the marginal product of labour. The 
early theoretical literature in this area (Oi (1962), Becker (1962), Parson (1972)) 
focused on the effect of firm-specific human capital on firms' wage policies and the 
consequences on the turnover of labour. Suppose the firm incurs an amount K of 
hiring and training costs in recruiting an additional worker in the initial period. Let 
wj and MPj denote the worker's wage and marginal product in period i , 
respectively. For the ease of illustration assume that the worker's working life 
consists of three periods only. Then in perfectly competitive markets, the long-run 
equilibrium condition of zero profit indicates 
(PI MPl - wi - K ) + ( P2 MP2 - W2 ) 6 + ( P3 MP3 - W3 ) 62 = 0 (32) 
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where pj is the output price of period i , and B is the discount factor. Suppose 
the firm forms single-valued expectations : 
Pi = p*, wi = w* for all i = 1,2,3. 
and the worker's periodic marginal product is estimated as 
MPi = MP* for i = 1,2, 3. 
Substituting these expected values in (32) and rearranging, the equilibrium 
condition reduces to 
p* MP* = w* + R (33) 
where R = K / (1 + 6 + ) jg the quasi-period rent (the amortization of the 
initial fixed employment costs, see Oi (1962)). 
Two implications can be inferred from condition (33). First, it indicates 
that in equilibrium 
p*MP* > w*. 
Thus wages of the trained worker are less than their marginal value products. 
Second, suppose an unanticipated permanent fall in product demand occurs during 
the post-investment period. Since the hiring and training costs are sunk, they exert 
no influence on the firm's short-run decision of employment. Therefore, given the 
assumption that the wage remains unchanged, employment will be maintained in 
the short-run (the period from the occurrence of demand fall to the retirement of the 
worker), as long as variations in the marginal value product of labour are within the 
range that 
w* < p* MP* < w* + R 
This result explains the "short-run" employment relationship between the firm and 
the worker in the presence of turnover costs. Notice that this is consistent with the 
condition predicted by the implicit labour contract theory that layoffs may occur if 
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marginal value product of labour is less than wages (see condition (28)), though 
the latter emphasizes the risk-sharing aspect in employment re la t ions . 
More recendy the literature has focused on the problems arising from 
sharing the cost and return of the specific investment between the two parties 
(Hashimoto and Yu (1980), Hashimoto (1981), Ohashi (1983)). This study is 
crucial when product demand is allowed to fluctuate and the specific human capital 
has altemative opportunities, because under these circumstances both parties may 
initiate non-optimal job separation. This is illustrated below. 
Suppose an amount of human capital, denoted by h , is produced by 
investment in training. The value of product per unit of /i is m to the present 
firm, and a in the altemative employment (which implies the skill is not totally 
firm-specific). Let the value of the trained worker in the current firm be given by 
V = H -I- mh 
and his altemative value be given by 
y = H ah 
where H is the value of the worker's general human capital. Suppose the 
worker's wage in the post-investment period takes the following form 
w = y + b ( v - y ) 0 < b < l (34) 
where b is the worker's share in the retum of the specific human capital. The 
firm's income from the investment will by 
v - w = ( l - b ) ( v - y ) 
In this setting if there are no fluctuations in product demand, the two parties can 
reach agreements on the values of v and y as well as the sharing ratio b , in 
advance of the investment. If the investment is proved to be correct ex post (in 
the sense that the realized v is greater than the realized y) , the employment 
12 However, the implicit labour contract model provides the rationale of 
invariant wage income across states, which is an assumption of the basic 
human capital theory. 
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relationship will be maintained. On the other hand, suppose the investment turns 
out to be an error (i. e. the realized v is less than the realized y ) , any separation 
decision is optimal regardless of the value of h . For Z? simply plays the role of 
assigning the propeny rights to the investment returns, which leaves the efficiency 
of the ultimate use of resources unaffected (Hashimoto (1981), p.477). 
The situation changes when fluctuations in product demand are considered, 
because the values of m and a can not be accurately measured and agreed upon in 
advance. This implies the existence of transaction costs in the post-investment 
period in evaluating and agreeing on the values of v and y . The transaction cost 
may be so huge that a flexible wage contract, like equation (30), is prohibited and 
a fixed wage contract is more suitable (Hashimoto and Yu (1980)). This 
consideration gives another explanation on invariant wage income across the state of 
the world without relying on risk-sharing p r o b l e m s . 
A sharing contract may be adopted when the transaction cost is not 
significant. Under this situation, for a given sharing ratio, the productivity shock 
will exert influences on the distributions of both v and y , and therefore on the 
quitting and dismissal probabilities (Hashimoto (1981)). This implies that it is 
meaningless to make causal distinctions between layoffs and quitting, because the 
separation rate is a joint outcome of these two probabilities. When the sharing of 
training costs is also allowed, it can be shown that the optimal wage profile is 
rising but the worker's wage is less than his marginal value product during the post-
investment period. 
13 The conclusion holds even if both the employer and the worker are risk-
neuti^. So in specific human capital theory it is the size of transaction costs, 
while in the implicit labour contract theory it is the risk-sharing, that makes 
wage invariant. 
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4. The Internal Hierarchy 
The early study of hierarchical organizations by Simon (1957) and Lydall 
(1968) sought to explain the observed skewness of the upper tail of income 
distribution in terms ofintemal structures of firms. Mirrlees (1976) and Calvo 
and WelHsz ((1978) (1979)) are the pioneers who put the intemal wage structure 
endogenously into models by including the role of supervision. Recent research 
has been directed to many aspects. Many problems arise when economists try to 
open the "black box" sealed in the neoclassical theory about the process that 
transforms the owner/manager's actions into an outcome. Typical questions are, 
among others : why does part of production activity occur within the firm, while 
other parts are market-mediated? (Williamson (1975)) Why are firms organized 
as they are? Are the hierarchical modes of firms more efficient than other forms, 
say "participation" mode of organization? (Williamson (1980), Putterman (1982), 
Manning (1986)). Up to now it seems there are no definite conclusions yet. 
For ease of exposition, in this section, the undeniable fact that hierarchical 
firms exist is simply accepted. This treatment allows us to avoid answering the 
above "difficult" questions and to concentrate totally on illustrating following the 
two main functions performed by hierarchical firms : supervision and information 
collection. 
4.1 Supervision 
Compensation schemes developed in the basic moral hazard model of 
section 2 did not mention the role of supervision in the determination of optimal 
contracts. There are two situations under which supervision schemes may arise : 
one is that monitoring may provide more information about the workers' effort than 
that provided under the basic moral hazard model (which simply infers the 
14 For recent study in this area see Waldman (1984b). 
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worker's effort from the ex post output). Thus it is the improvement in the 
accuracy of information collection about the worker's effort that motivates the 
existence of supervision. The second siuiation is different from the first one : 
sometimes due to technological reasons, such as in team production, outputs 
generated by individual workers are not observable or too cosdy to measure. Thus 
the incentive scheme proposed in the basic moral hazard model is not feasible. 
Supervision must be adopted to ensure the adequacy of effort input supplied by the 
workers (Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). 
Analysing the role of supervision under the first situation considers the trade 
off between marginal increases in productivity through more work effort and the 
increase in monitoring costs required to induce i t The focus point is to provide 
conditions under which the value of the information collected about the worker's 
effort is positive, that is, the conditions under which it pays for firms to have 
supervision activity (Holmstrom (1979)). The analysis also discusses the optimal 
sharing rule under this situation, and gives an explanation on the existence of the so 
called dichotomous contract where the worker is paid a predetermined wage if the 
results of monitoring reveal that his effort is acceptable, otherwise die worker 
receives a less preferred fixed payment (Harris and Raviv (1979)). Singh (1985) 
gives a condition under-which an optimal level of monitoring (defined as the ratio 
of supervisors in efficiency units to supervisees) can be determined. 
For the second simation the typical approach is to accept the fact that 
supervision is inevitable and to ignore the problem about the value of monitoring 
discussed in the first situation. These approaches usually assume the polar cases 
that the workers can either work or shirk. Supervision is used as a tool to convince 
the workers that the monitoring system is effective (rather than measuring the units 
of the individual workers' effort). A probability p of detection of shirking is 
formulated, along with an implicit contractual arrangement that predetermined 
wages will be paid if the worker is not caught shirking, otherwise he is sacked. 
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This set-up allows one to focus on other aspects of the hierarchical firms. For 
example, Calvo and Wellisz (1978) attempted (but failed) to answer the question 
of how an optimal size of pyramid-shaped firms is determined under this kind of 
supervision technology. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) used this supervision 
scheme to formulate an "efficient wage" model to explain the existence of 
involuntary unemployment. ^ 6 
4 2 Collection of Information and Job Assignments 
The necessity of monitoring provides one explanation of a characteristic of 
the organization of firms, namely the existence of what Stiglitz (1975) calls 
horizontal hierarchy : within a firm the number of employees being paid higher 
wages (such as the supervisors or managers) is less than the number being paid 
lower wages (such as the workers). Another observed feature of firms is vertical 
hierarchy : a high proportion of supervisors (or managers) are promoted through 
lines of progression within the same organization. This is one of the main 
characteristics of the (enterprise) internal labour market structure documented by 
Doeringer and Piore (1971). 
If promotions within a firm are possible, can supervision of effort explain 
the existence of vertical hierarchy? Guasch (1983) points out that promotions 
based simply on measuring individual efforts may lead to adverse selection, in that 
- - S 
, the least talented workers are chosen. The intuition behind this is easy to 
understand. At the beginning of hiring, the firm does not have knowledge about a 
15 An optimal size of multi-level firms may be determined by considerations 
other than the requirement of supervision. Keren and Levhari (1983) show 
that a firm's size is constrained by communication costs. That is, the cost of 
time lost in decision-making within a hierarchical firm may be so huge that 
the firm may decide to limit its level of ranks. 
16 Shapiro and Stiglitz's model is a kind of simple hierarchy : It contains two 
levels only, the owner/supervisor and the workers. 
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worker's talent. Suppose the abilities of the hired workers, a , fall 'Aithin an 
interval (aL, an), where a^ > aL. The workers are all assigned to the same 
tasks and face the same wage (since they are indistinguishable). Now if 
reservation wages are positively correlated with talent, one can see that, ceteris 
paribus, the lower ability worker may supply more effon than the high ability 
worker does. This is because his opportunity wage is lower and the threat of being 
dismissed is more effective with him. Therefore, a selection policy based on effort 
supervision may result in promoting the least able persons. This result has the 
implication that job promotions should be based on the consideration of ability. 
This accords with the empirical observation that typically in the internal labour 
market ability is used as the most commonly criterion for promotions (Doeringer 
andPiore (1971), p.211). 
The study of firms' decisions on promotion in terms of individual worker's 
abilities is a relatively new field. The incentive scheme proposed in the basic 
adverse selection model of agency theory is a way of abstracting information about 
workers' abilities. Its applicability depends on die precision of the worker's 
knowledge of his talent. From the viewpoint of employers, information about an 
employee's ability is important simply because it improves the accuracy of job 
assignments. In job-matching models like Jovanovic (1979), Mortenson (1978) 
and others, a worker's fuuire productivity is purely matching-specific : there is a 
learning process which improves die quality of a match (a "good match" is one 
17 Malcomson (1984) formulates a two-period model where an employee's 
promotion is based on his relative performance, which in turn, is affected by 
the employee's work effort. He can demonstrate that the existence of 
promotions and associated increases in wages have positive effects on work 
incentives. However, he cannot explain the pyramid structure of the firm. 
Moreover, we must notice that compensations based on tournament like 
Malcomson's, may have adverse incentives for losers (the non-promoted 
has got nothing in return for his hard work) and may be detrimental to 
cooperation among workers. 
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producing high expected producdvity). In these models information about the 
worker's productivity in die current job is irrelevant to job matching. This 
specification does not seem to fit the facts well. A more interesting model of 
promotion is developed by Harris and Holmstrom (1982) who look at a 
competitive labour market in which information that a fum gathers on a worker's 
ability immediately becomes common knowledge. The firm (and the market) 
learns about a worker's ability by observing his output over time. Random 
flucmations in perceived abiUty are possible because output and ability are not 
perfectiy correlated. They demonstrate that optimal long-term contracts have tiie 
property that wages are inflexible downwards. The worker's wage will never 
decline with his age (because there is a positive learning effect about his 
ability/productivity), and it will increase only when his market value increases 
above his current wage (due to the assumption of symmetric information about the 
worker's ability). 
In a two-period model Waldman (1984a) investigates the following 
situation where information is not common knowledge : the firm gathers 
information about an employee's ability during the first period, then uses it to 
decide his second-period job assignment, which in turn signals the worker's 
ability. Information is thus imperfectiy transmitted to outside firms. In his model 
there is firm-specific human capital that makes the worker more valuable to the 
current firm. He obtains some properties of the hierarchical firms, e. g. wages are 
more closely related with jobs than with ability levels. The wage profile which will 
prevail in his model, the flat one or the upward-sloping one, depends on the values 
of the parameters. 
RicartlCosta (1988) takes a further step by allowing employees to have 
information about their abilities after staying at a firm for one period. This 
consideration implies that the employee may exploit his information to separate 
himself out of the market place. In the first period a long-term contract is signed. 
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which commits wage payments for two periods. In the second period, the 
incumbent employee has his forecasted market opportunities, while the current firm 
can choose its promotion rule (to promote or not to promote him), so a bargaining 
set-up is created. A market equilibrium obtains when possible employers can only 
make zero expected profits from hiring the employee, the promotion rule chosen by 
the current firm maximizes its second period profits, and the incumbent employee 
cannot obtain a better deal than the present one. His assumption about information 
(the information about employees' abilities is perfectiy known to both the cuirent 
firm and incumbent employees, but outside firms only have imperfect information 
from the signal of job assignments) generates several properties for the optimal 
contract. First, wages for incumbent employees are highly dependent on the job 
assignment, but there are also wage differential within jobs reflecting differences in 
individual abilities. Second, the current firm is in a superior position to the 
employees and outside firms because it has perfect information. So it pays the 
risk-averse employee a second-period wage that is lower than his expected 
productivity but equal to the certainty equivalent of his market wage. 
The recent article by MacLoed and Malcomson (1988) is of interest in that 
it considers a broader situation where the hierarchical firm decides on an employee's 
promotions in terms of his performance, which, in turn, is determined by his 
effort level. The role of an individual's ability is modelled as inversely related to 
the disutility of work effort. Outside firms can get information about the 
employee's performance through his rank in the organization. The contract 
contains a series of pairs of wages and ranks offered by die firm. It gives an 
explanation of the discrete ranks in an organization although observation of abilities 
is continuous : under the assumption of symmetric information employees in a rank 
receive wages equal to their marginal products in that rank. To prevent shirking, 
ranks can be constructed so that the lowest ability employees in a rank are 
indifferent between performing just well enough to stay there, and shirking for one 
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period, then being rehired by other firms in the ranJc below. It is clear that higher-
ability employees in the same rank will not shirk, because disutility of work effort 
is decreasing in ability by assumption. Promotions through ranks also avoid the 
problem of adverse selection and, since to be promoted an employee must work 
hard, the firm gets profits from hiring him before he reaches the appropriate rank. 
The above analyses discuss promotions on individual bases, i. e. they 
assume the firm decides on promotions only on the basis of individual abilities. 
Oswald (1984) builds a model in which a worker's prospect of promotion depends 
on the ratio of job vacancy to the number of competitors. A worker enters the 
internal labour market serving as a junior in the first period. He may be promoted 
to senior status in the second period. Unfortunately the exact promotion rule is not 
specified in his model. Neither ability nor any other considerations such as specific 
skills are taken into the firm's decision of promotion. Therefore, though the 
worker has the risk of being not promoted, the conditions under which upward 
sloping wage profiles will prevail are not clarified in his model. 
Apparendy when promotions are based on competition among workers 
within an organization, factors such as the timing of promotion and the probability 
of promotion at any point of time, will have tremendous influence on an 
individual's quitting decision. This is of special significance when the 
consideration covers the horizon of a worker's life time (Cooter and Restrepo 
(1979)). Dynamic factors, such as a firm's growth rate, also affect the wage 
structure it offers to the workers through changes in the prospect of promotions 
(Chiang (1986)). 
In hierarchical firms it is not only the employer but also the employees who 
can exert influence on the outcome of employment relations. Individual workers 
may adopt influencing activities to get a better job assignment or other benefits from 
the firm (Milgrom (1988), Tirole (1986)). To prevent managers'discretionary 
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behaviour or collusion among workers and managers, the firm may prefer 
bureaucratic procedures, such as the seniority rule, in job assignments or 
promotions. 
5. Concluding Remark 
In the previous sections three branches of analysis have been examined in 
explaining the employment relationships. The agency theory is primarily 
concerned with designing optimal compensation schemes in the presence of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. In the implicit contract models, by ignoring the 
problems arising from the agent's moral hazard and adverse selection, the 
possibility and the effects of job separation receive full attention. Models of 
hierarchical firms focus on organizational characteristics of ± e employment 
relations. 
Despite the tremendous progress in this area, there are still many problems 
to be considered. For example, in agency theory the conditions under which piece 
rates (which are common in contracts for salesman and sharecropping systems) 
prevail remain largely unsettied.^^ The complicated payment schemes predicted 
by the theory seem inconsistent with the observed contracts that use only a few 
parameters (the managerial compensation contracts may be an exception). In 
hierarchical firms, in order to investigate how the task of designing career tracks 
and continually grading, sorting and assigning workers to their proper positions 
will affect the firm's performance, it seems necessary to use a dynamic personnel 
policy (Rosen (1987)). 
18 Both Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) 
discuss the conditions under which the piece rate prevails. They both 
assume that the agent and the principal are risk-neutral. 
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Appendix II 
A Formal Treatment of The Sorting Model 
This approach presents a formal proof of some propositions that Rees 
(1985) stated but did not prove. His model is also modified slightiy. 
The principal's problem is to find a pair (XL, WL) and (xpj, w^) to 
maximize his net income 
[ XL - WL ] + ( 1 - r ) [ XH - WH ] 
where r is the proportion of workers with low ability, which is assumed to be 
given. The maximum is subject to four constraints : 
u(wl) - v ( x L / a L ) > U(WH) - v ( x H / a L ) ; (Al) 
u(wh) - v( xh / an ) ^ u(wl) - v( XL / an ) ; (A2) 
U(WL) - v ( x L / a L ) > Uo; (A3) 
and 
U(wh) - v ( x H / a H ) >Uo. (A4) 
The last two constraints are called the individual rationality (IR) constraints : a 
worker would take an offer only if it gives a utility level not less than his reservation 
utility level. The first two constraints are truth telling constraints (or incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraints): no one should gain by claiming to have 
characteristics different from his own. It will be shown below tiiat only constraints 
(A2) and (A3) bind. 
The Lagrangean is 
£ = r [ XL - W l ] + ( 1 - r ) [ xh - WH ] 
+ |lL { U(wl) - v( xi^aL) - U(WH) - v( XH^l ) } 
+ Hh { u(wh) - v( xn/aH ) - u(wl) - v( x^yaH) } 
+ 6L { U(WL) - v( XL/ AL ) - UQ } - BH { U(WH) - v( XH^H ) - UQ } 
The first-order conditions are : 
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a£/3xL = r - i^L v'( xl/el) ( 1/aL) + v'( x^/ an) ( 1/aH) 
- 6L V'( XL/aJ ( 1/aL) = 0 (A5) 
a£/axH = ( 1 - r ) - i^H v'( XL/aH ) ( l/an ) + Xh^l ) ( ) 
-6h v'(xH/aH)(l/aH) = 0 (A6) 
3£/awL = - r + |iL u'(wl) - i^H u'(wl) + 6l u'(wl) = 0 (A7) 
a£/awH = - ( 1 - r ) + |IH U'(WH) - i^L U'(WH) + 6H U'(WH) = 0 (A8) 
a£/a!iL >0, i^L >0, ^L = o (A9) 
a£/a^H |iH ^ 0, ^H = 0 (Aio) 
a£/a6L 6l Sl = 0 (All) 
a£/aSH>0, 6 h > 0 , 6h (3£/36h) = 0- (A 12) 
First, it shows that (A4) holds with strict inequality : 
u(wh) - v(xH/aH) > u(wl) - v(xL/aH) by (A2) 
> U(WL) - v(xiyaL) > Uo. 
Therefore, set = ^ in (A8), which in turn implies that 
i^H > I^ L- (A13) 
Now from (A7) 
6l u'(wl) = r + ( ^h - ^L ) u'(wl) 
Hence 6l > 0, which implies that (A3) holds with equality. 
Next, we show that jiL = 0. Suppose )J.l > 0. Then (Al) holds 
with equality, and this would imply that one of the following three possibilities will 
hold: 
C a) xh = XL and wh = wl 
(b) Xh > XL and w^ > wl 
(c) Xh < XL and wh < wl-
If (c) were true, then the pair (xh, wh) and the pair (xl, wl) will be as 
depicted in Figure A1. This would imply that type-H workers prefer (xl, wl) to 
(xh, Wh), contradicting constraint (A2). On the other hand, if (b) were true, 
then type-H workers would strictly prefer (xh, wh) to (xl, wl), implying that 
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Figure A1 
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M-h = 0, contradicting the optimal condition (A 13). If (a) were true, then from 
(A6), with Bh = 0, 
( 1 - r ) = ^H v'(xH/aH) ( 1 % ) - 1^1 ( I / ^ l ) (AM) 
and from (A8) 
( l - r ) = (^iH - u'(wh) (A15) 
and, adding (A5) to (A6), with x l = Xh, gives 
l -6Lv ' (xL /aL) ( l / a L ) = 0 . (A16) 
Adding (A7) to (A8), with w^ = w^. gives 
1 - BL U'(wl) = 0. (A 17) 
From (A15) and (A17), with w l = w^, 
l - r = (A18) 
From (A 14) and (A16), with x l = x^, 
1 - r = i^H v'(xH/aH) ( l/an) - ( ) • (A19) 
From (A 18) and (A 19) 
v'(xH/aH) ( l / an ) = 1/6L- (A20) 
From (A20) and (A 16), with x l = x^ 
v'(xL/aH) ( l / a n ) = ( 1/aL). (A21) 
implying XL/a^ > xjyaL, a contradiction. 
It can be concluded, therefore, that | I l = 0- With [J-l = 0 and 6fi = 
0, combining (A6) and (A8) gives 
v'(xH/aH) ( l / a n ) = U'(WH)-
It follows that the first-best rule (equation (17) in the main text) is preserved for 
type-H workers (though, of course, the actual values (xpj, w^) are smaller than 
in die first-best case, because the bundle for workers is now located on a higher 
indifference curve. 
Finally, from (A5) and (A7), 
v'(xL/aL) (1/aL) < U'(WL), 
r.H- : m •r. y : - . ^^^ . , 
which implies a "distortion" (as compared with the first-best rule (18) in the main ' ' r 
Sf.' . 
iii 
- ^ ^ I^aV r - l . 
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CHAPTER m 
A THEORY OF WAGE PROFILES AND PROMOTIONS 
IN A HIERARCHICAL FIRM 
1. Introduction 
One of the empirical findings concerning earnings profiles is that earnings 
tend to increase with tenure and experience (Becker (1975) Chapter?). This 
phenomenon has received several explanations. 
The most obvious explanation is the human capital theory : during their 
working life workers accumulate productivity enhancing skills (Becker (1962), 
Hashimoto (1981)), and their wages increase as they become more productive. 
Another explanation is that even when workers' intrinsic abilities stay 
unchanged, firms gradually learn about workers' comparative advantages and 
improve their decisions on job allocation. This is a by-product of the theory of 
turnover and may be called the "job matching explanation" (see Mortenson (1978) 
andJevanovic (1979)). 
A third explanation lies in the incentive aspect of wage contracts. Lazear 
(1979) argues that 
"a wage profile which pays workers less when they are 
young and more when they are old will allow the workers 
and firm to behave in such a way as to raise the present 
value of marginal product [through less incentive to shirk] 
over the life time." (p. 1264). 
A similar model emphasizing work incentive is that of Malcomson (1984). 
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Harris and Holmstrom (1982) provides another explanation, based on 
learning and risk aversion. In their model both workers and firms are imperfectly 
informed about workers' abilities, and learning about the true abilities takes place 
gradually. It is assumed that workers can quit to accept higher offers from other 
firms; this forces up the wage of workers who have learnt that they are probably 
more able than expected (in their model the workers, the employers, and outside 
firms aU have access to the same information : it is a "common knowledge" model). 
Workers who have been found to be less able than originally expected will not be 
demoted, because being risk averse, all workers are willing to work at an initial 
wage which is lower than the original expected marginal product, in exchange for 
the promise that wages will not be cut in the future. As a result, wages display 
downward rigidity. 
In Harris and Holmstrom's model, it is not clear how firms learn about the 
abilities of the workers they do not employ. In the market for academics, perhaps 
the signals are publications and conference activities. For top level managers, the 
profit rates of their firms are probably a good indicator. For less senior executives, 
the signals seem to come from the employer's promotion decision. This, 
however, is not modeled by Harris and Holmstrom. In the absence of a 
hierarchical structure, it is not clear how the employee's revealed ability becomes 
known to the market. 
The object of this chapter is to model explicitiy the relationship between the 
firm's hierarchical structure and its implicit wage contract. It is assumed that the 
market can make inferences about an individual's productivity only by observing 
the position and functions he takes witiiin the firm. A worker can use his 
promotion as a signal to the market and seek a higher wage elsewhere, because he 
is free to quit. To keep the worker, the firm offering the promotion prospect must 
also offer an associated wage increase. At first sight, one might think that this 
would imply that the firm has no incentive to promote any of its employees. 
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However, in a firm where supervision is necessary (to perform the activities of 
coordination, communication, and monitoring, etc), some senior workers have to 
become supervisors, and this change in functions and status, even in the absence 
of any wage increase, is regarded as a promotion by the market. 
The model involves many considerations and many assumptions. The roles 
of various assumptions will not be easily assessed unless the basic building blocks 
are looked at one at a time. To this end. Section 2 is devoted to a study of some 
building blocks, and the implications of various assumptions. The model will then 
be assembled together in Section 3 to give a whole picture of wage profiles in the 
hierarchical firm. 
2. The Basic Building Blocks 
This section presents some preliminary models which illustrate the role of 
the firm as an insurer, and the role of the assumption of freedom to quit on the 
wage structure. 
2.1 Preliminary Model 1: The firm as an insurer 
When a young worker enters the firm he may not have information about his 
ability (productivity). Under certain conditions it may be optimal for the firm to 
provide the junior worker with "insurance" against the risk tiiat he comes out to be a 
low ability person and must receive a wage cut in the future. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the time horizon contains two periods only and suppose the firm has 
only one position to fill, and the contract it considers offering is a tenure one (i. e. 
the firm does not dismiss the worker; the reason why tenure contract is focused on 
will be explained at a later stage). Workers are assumed to be drawn from a known 
distribution with the expected ability (productivity) being x. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that there are only two possible outputs for workers, x + b or x - b 
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(high or low) and that the probabilities are a half in each case. At the end of period 
1 the worker's ability will be revealed to him, and to the market (through a 
mechanism to be discussed later). 
In order to emphasize the insurance aspect of the wage contract, assume 
that firms are risk neutral while workers are risk averse. It is also assumed that 
workers do not discount future utility, and that the rate of interest is zero. 
Consider first the case where the wage contract not only binds ±e 
employers but also binds the workers. Let w j denote the first period wage, and 
wj^  and Wy be the second period wages corresponding to the events that the 
revealed ability is high and low, respectively. Then the worker's expected life-
time utility is 
U(wi) + .5 U(wv) + .5 U(wh). (1) 
where U is strictly concave and increasing. Notice that (1) implicitly assumes 
that the worker cannot borrow and lend, nor can he take out insurance outside, 
apart from the insurance implicit in the wage contract. 
The firm's expected wage cost is 
wi + 5 Wv + .5 wjj. (2) 
Competition among firms in the factor market will lead them to offer an 
efficient contract that maximizes the worker's expected life-time utility (1), subject 
to the firm's expected wage cost (2) not exceeding a given level (for example, in 
a competitive product market expected profit is zero, implying that it is equal to M, 
the expected life-time product of the worker, where M = x + .5 (x - b) 
+ .5 (x + b)). 
Clearly an efficient contract must equalize the worker's marginal utilities 
across all periods and all events : 
U'(wi) = U'(Wv) = U'(wh). 
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This implies 
wi = wv = wh. (3) 
In particular, if the constraint is that the expected wage cost be no greater than M, 
then these wages equal x Thus an efficient contract offers complete insurance, 
provided that the worker may not breach the contract by quitting when he leams that 
his ability is high.l 
Note that if there were a "perfect" insurance market, the firm would not 
need to perform the insurance activity. It could simply pay the worker w^ = x, 
Wy = X - b and w^ = x + b according to the revealed ability, while the 
worker would take out an insurance contract with an insurance firm against the 
uncertainty of his wage income. The premium would be $b , payable at the 
beginning of period 2, and the worker would receive a payment of $2b from the 
insurance firm in the event that his ability is low, and nothing in the event that his 
ability is high. 
The question of the efficiency of tenure contracts is now considered. In the 
model since the incentive problems are assumed away,2 It can be seen intuitively 
that tenure contracts are efficient, because they provide complete insurance. This 
is now proved formally. 
This is the efficient solution of risk-sharing : the risk-averse party (the 
worker here) gets a fixed income across "periods", while the risk-neutral 
party (the firm) gets the residual income. 
Shirking may happen if individual effort is not observable and/or the firm 
cannot effectively monitor its workers. This will change the expected output 
X. More serious incentive problem arise if the worker can take out insurance 
from the insurance company for their wage income. It is possible that the 
firm always claims that the worker's ability is low and pays him x - b. It 
makes no difference for the worker to be classified as the high ability or the 
low ability since he has the insurance, but the insurance company will incur 
losses. 
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Assume that initially the economy is in equilibrium, and all firms offer 
tenure contracts and achieve zero expected profit, then as has been stated above, 
the following must hold : 
W1 = Wy = wh = X. (4) 
Under these circumstances the worker's expected life-time utility, as is clear from 
(4), is 
U(wi) + .5 U(wv) + .5 U(wh) = 2 U(x). 
Is it profitable for a subset of firms to deviate fhDm this equilibrium? 
Suppose the deviating firms keep only those workers whose abilities are revealed to 
be high, and dismiss those workers whose abilities are low. Apparendy those laid 
off workers can still earn an outside wage x - b (because it is their confirmed 
productivity). With this policy, to attract workers, the deviating firms must offer 
higher w^ and/or w^ so that the worker's expected life-time utility is kept at 
2U(x), the utility level derivable from the tenure contracts, i. e. 
U(wi ' ) -H .5 U(x -b) + .5 U(wh') = 2 U(x). (5) 
(where the apostrophe denotes the wages offered by the deviant firms). We want 
to show that if w^' and w^' satisfy (5), then the firm will make a loss i. e. 
w i ' + . 5 wh' > X + .5 (x + b). (6) 
The assumption that the contract binds the workers is retained here (he cannot leave 
the firm in period 2 when his ability is revealed to be high). 
Consider tiie set of all ( w f , wh') which satisfy (5). Clearly that element 
which minimizes the expected cost has the property that w f = w^'. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below, where the indifference curve for (5) is tangent to the 
"isocost" line at point A which indicates that w f = w^' is optimal. So set 
Wj ' = Wh' = w', the participation constraint (5) is now reduced to 
U(w') = (4 / 3) U(x) - (1 / 3) U(x - b) (5') 
and the condition (6) is reduced to 
w ' > X -H (1/3) b. (6') 
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45° line 
^ ( w ^ ' ) + .5 U(w h')=2U(x) - .5 U(x - b) 
w-| + .5w^= constant (slope = -2) 
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All that is needed is to show that when (5') holds, then (6') is met. Since 
U( •) is strictly concave and increasing, it suffices to show that 
U [ 4 x / 3 - ( x - b ) / 3 ] < (4 /3 ) U(x) - (1 /3 ) U( x - b ) (7) 
or, more generally, that for all r > 1, and x^ty, 
U [ t x + ( l - t ) y ] < t U(x) + (1 -1) U(y). (8) 
But as shown in Appendix mA, this is true for all strictly concave functions. 
Figure 2 illustrates this : Since t > 1, the "weighted average" has a negative 
weight and a positive weight, and lies outside the interval (y, x). Now the term 
on the right-hand-side of (7) equals U(w'), indicating that U(x + ( 1 / 3 ) 5 ) 
< U(w'), i .e . w' > x + ( l / 3 ) b holds. 
To summarize, the tenure contracts are efficient in the absence of the 
problem of "hidden action" or "moral hazard", and when a worker's productivity 
is the same across firms. Note that the preliminary model is slightly different firom 
the standard implicit contract model in that it has a time structure, though essentially 
they are quite similar in tackling the problem of risk-sharing. 
22 Preliminary Model 2 : The implication of quitting 
In this section Model 1 is modified by denying firms' contracts that are 
bound to workers. This is a step toward realism because that type of contract is not 
often observed in practice. There are several reasons for this. Firstiy, such 
contracts may be very difficult to enforce : a worker can simply disappear and seek 
employment elsewhere. The firm could, of course, ask the workers to post a 
bond which will be forfeited in the event of quitting; however this would 
necessarily reduce the worker's first period consumption and cause the marginal 
utility of consumption in period 1 to be too high. Secondly, for reasons outside 
the model, it may be inefficient to prevent quitting : a worker may find out that his 
outside marginal product - perhaps adjusted to psychic gains or losses ~ is 
higher tiian that of the current firm, so that it is socially efficient to allow the 
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worker to leave. Of course if all events are costlessly observable, an efficient 
contract can be drawn which specifies all contingencies. However, the world is 
ridden by asymmetric information, and this inevitably makes contracts incomplete.3 
For analytical purposes here, we simply assume that it is not possible to 
prevent quitting and that to keep a worker whose ability is revealed to be high, the 
firm has to at least pay wages no less than his (expected) productivity. The 
following analysis characterizes the properties of an efficient tenure contract which 
has to face the following non-quitting constraints : 
wh > X + b (9) 
Wv > X - b. (10) 
Efficiency requires the maximization of the expected life-time utility 
U(wi) + .5 U(wv) + .5 U(wh) 
subject to (9), (10) and the constraint that the firm does not make losses : 
x -f-.5 (x + b) + .5 (x - b) > w j + .5 Wy + .5 w^. (11) 
Clearly, because of (9) and (10), the perfect insurance property (4) of Model 1 
can no longer be obtained. 
The main results of this model are stated below. 
Proposition 1. The efficient wage contract satisfies the following properties 
(I) Wh = X + b; 
(II) Wy = wi > x - b; 
(III) wi < x; and 
(IV) the worker is worse off, compared with the case where quitting is not 
allowed. 
3 This issue is not discussed here, as it has been treated elsewhere, see, for 
example Shavell (1984). 
55 
Proof It is easy to provide a formal proof using Kuhn-Tucker theory. 
However a more intuitive (and ratiier long-winded) proof is preferred. First, 
assume wj^  = x + b and want to show that x > w v = w i > x - b will hold. 
Essentially, this is the "second best" insurance result Next, we show that a 
small deviation from the above wage package while maintaining the firm's expected 
cost will result in deceases in the worker's expected utility, hence it is optimal to 
maintain the above wage package. For a given w^ = x + b, the firm's "no-loss" 
condition (11) can be written as 
wi + .5 Wv < 1.5 X - .5 b. (12) 
The feasible set is depicted in Figure 3 : It is the triangle formed by the two axes 
and the borderline of (12): 
Wv = 3 X - b - 2 wi (13) 
the line has slope dwy/dwj = - 2. 
The employee's expected life-time utility is 
U(wi) + .5 U(wv) + .5 U(x b) 
The indifference curves, drawn in Figure 3, are strictiy convex and have slope 
dwv/dwi = -U ' (wi ) / .5U ' (Wv) 
The slope is - 2 when w j = Wy. The tangent point B indicates that the 
worker's expected utility is maximized when w j = Wy. Substituting this in (13) 
yields 
wi* = Wy* = X - (1/3) b. 
Hence (II) and (III) are proved. Note that the constraint Wy > x - b holds 
with strict inequality. 
Next, assume the firm deviates from the above wage package by offering 
wh" = x + h + e and wi" = Wy" = x - (1 / 3) b + g(e), where e > 0 {e < 0 
would violate (9)), and g(e) is determined so that tiie firm's expected cost is the 
same as that determined from (w^*, Wy*, w^): 
1.5 [ x - ( 1 / 3 ) b ] + .5(x + b) = 1 . 5 [ x - ( l / 3 ) b + g(e)] + .5 (x + b + e) 
Wv, 
3 x - b 
0 
0 . u y 45 Une 
\ slope = -2 
1.5x - .5b 
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which implies 
g(e) = - ( l / 3 ) e . 
So under the deviating arrangement Lhe worker's expected utility is 
U(e) = 1.5 U ( x - ( b + e ) / 3 ) + .5 U(x + b + e) . 
Differentiating the above equation with respect to e gives 
aU(e)/ae = -.5 U ' ( x - ( b + e ) / 3 ) + .5 U'(x + b + e) < 0. 
The result indicates that the deviant policy is never optimal. 
Finally, note that at an optimum the employee's expected life-time utility is 
strictly less than his life-time expected product: 
1 . 5 U ( x - b / 3 ) + .5 U(x + b) < 2U(x) 
The proof of this is along the lines of (7): The above inequality implies 
U ( x - b / 3 ) < (4 /3) U(x) - (1/3) U(x + h ) 
It can easily be seen that if U(w*) is set such that: 
U(w*) = (4 /3) U(x) - (1 /3) U(x + b) 
then 
w* > [ ( 4 / 3 ) x - ( l /3 ) (x-Hb)] = X - (1 /3) b 
which implies 
U(w*) > U ( x - b / 3 ) . 
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
Result (TV) of Proposition 1 is another instance of the general principle that 
the inability to bind oneself to a voluntary agreement will result in a sub-optimal 
outcome. Here, the workers' inability to convince the firm that a full insurance 
wage contract will be adhered to (by not quitting when productivity is high) makes 
them worse off. 
We now modify Model 2 by admitting more than two levels of realized 
ability. This has the effect that workers who come out to have abilities lower than a 
given level (though in different degrees) may receive the same wage, while those 
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with abilities higher than a critical one are paid different wages. We call tiiis result 
"bunching at the lower end ". An example is used to illustrate the point. 
Suppose that at the end of period 1, a worker's ability may take any one of 
the following four possible values : x + 4b, x + b, x - b, x - 4b, each with 
probability .25. Let the corresponding wages be w^^, wj^, Wy, and Wyy. It 
will be shown that the following wage profile is optimal: 
whh > wh > W y = W w = wi 
where w j is the first period wage. 
We set wj^h = x + 4b, w}^  = x + b. To determine w j (= Wy = Wyy) the 
zero profit condition is used : 
x + .25 (x + 4b) + .25 (x + b) + .25 (x - b) + .25 (x - 4b) 
= .25 wj^h -25 wji + 1.5 w^. 
This yields 
1.5 X - 1.25 b = 1.5 wi. 
Hence w j = x - (5 /6) b, which is greater than the non-quitting constraint for 
the low ability worker. It is easy to check that the solution satisfies the Kuhn-
Tucker condition for the problem of maximization of expected life-time utility 
subject to zero profit and non-quitting constraints. The bunching result in the 
above example depends crucially, among other things, on the probability 
distribution. Suppose the probabilities .25 at tiie two taU were replace by .4 and 
the probability .1 were given to x + b and x - b, then bunching would no longer 
be optimal. To prove this, suppose bunching occurred and w^ = Wy = Wyy. 
Then the zero profit condition would give 
x + .4 (x + 4b) + .1 (X + b) + .1 (X - b) + .4 (x - 4b) 
= .4 whh + .1 wh + 1.5 wi 
and, since w^h = x + 4b and wh = x + b, this reduces to 
w i = X- ( 1 7 / l l ) b . 
Hence Wy < x - b, violates the no-quitting constraint. It follows that under the 
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probability distribution (0.40, 0.10, 0.10, 0.40), the optimal wages are 
whh = X + 4b 
wj^  = X + b 
Wy = X - b 
and 
Ww = wi 
where w j is the solution of 
.4 (x - 4b ) + X = 1.4 wi 
which implies w j = x - (8 / 7) b. The above optimal wage profile is depicted in 
Figure 4. 
Ww = wi Wy (= X - b) X w^ (= X f b) w^h 
Figure 4 
Note that in this case, the worker with ability level x - b earns more in 
period 2 than the junior worker (whose expected product is x). This fact may be 
explained in terms of the implicit insurance premium paid by the risk averse junior 
worker. 
The results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. With more than two realized abilit>- levels, the efficient wage 
contract may involve bunching at the lower end and/or paying the junior worker 
less than a low-ability senior worker. 
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23 Preliminary Model 3: Implications of on-the-job training 
In all the models developed above the worker's first period wage is never 
less than that of the senior worker with the the lowest ability level. The model is 
now modified to allow for on-the-job training. This modification will result in the 
possibility that the first period wage is less than ±e lowest wage in the second 
period of the worker's productive life. This is not surprising : as the human 
capital theory points out, workers are willing to work at a wage below marginal 
product in order to pay for the cost of training. The difference is the worker's 
share of training costs. This model shows that even if there are no training costs to 
be shared by the worker, a low wage in the first period is acceptable in exchange 
for the opportunity of accumulating skills and the prospect of future wage increases. 
We retain the assumption that the probability a worker is "good" 
(productivity x + b) equals the probability that he is "bad" (productivity x - b), 
but to highlight the problem the following assumption is : only the good worker 
can accomplish the training and enhance his second period productivity to x + b 
+ s, where ^ > 0 and is valuable to the market, while the bad worker is 
incapable of accumulating human capital and his output in period 2 is still x - b. 
The non-quitting constraint becomes 
wh > X + b + s (14) 
wv > X - b (15) 
In addition, it is assumed that the firm under considerations belongs to a 
group of firms which have the ability to provide training to their workers without 
incurring costs. With this assumption the firm would expect to earn a positive 
profit (this may, of course, be regarded as the imputed value of its training 
ability). An employee can join the firm or get a life-time expected utility 2U(x) 
elsewhere. 
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The problem is to maximize the finn's expected profit: 
E(7I) = X + .5 ( x - b ) + .5 (x + b + s) - WJ - .5 WY - .5 WJ^  
subject to constraints (14), (15) and the following participation constraint: 
U(wi) + .5 U(wv) + .5 U(wh) > 2U(x). (16) 
The following proposition can now be proved. 
Proposition 3, The efficient contract of the above problem has the following 
properties 
(I) wh = x + b + s; 
(n) Wy > w j , with strict inequality holding if s is sufficiendy large; 
(HI) If Wy > w^, then Wy = x - b ; and 
(IV) Wy > X - b only if Wy = w^. 
Proof By the usual argument, it is not optimal to allow to exceed x 
+ b + s, therefore we set w^ = x + b + s. Profit maximization implies that (16) 
holds with equality. Hence 
U(wi) + .5 U(wy) = 2U(x) - .5 U(x + b + s). (17) 
Now suppose the constraint (15) is not binding, then the usual insurance 
argument implies w^ = Wy = w* is optimal, where w* solves (17): 
1.5 U(w*) = 2 U(x) - .5 U(x + b + s). (18) 
This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
In the figure LL represents the indifference curve of (18) for a given value 
of s . The isoprofit line and the indifference curve are tangent at point E, which 
implies, when the constraint (15) is not binding, w^ = Wy= w* is optimal. 
This proves (IV). For a higher value of s the indifference curve will shift 
downward, say to JJ, thus determining a new w" on the 45° line (this 
corresponds to a higher expected profit). Clearly if 5 is large enough, w" wiU be 
smaller than x - b and ceases to be the common value for w j and Wy. The 
constrained efficient contract in this case must have the property that Wy = x - b 
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and wi < X - b. Point F of Figure 5 shows the combination. This proves (U) 
and (m). 
A numerical example 
Let U(w) = wl/2, X = 1, b = .5, and s = .5. Then (18) gives 
1.5 (w*)l/2 = 2 - .707 = 1.293. 
Thus 
w* = .743 > X - b ( = .5 ). 
In this case the constraint (15) is not binding, and the solution is 
Wh = 2, Wv = wi = .743 > X - b. 
Now taking a higher value, s = 3.5 Then from (18) 
1.5 (w*)l/2 = 2 - 1.118 = .882. 
Thus w* = .345 < X - b, which indicates that w* cannot be the common value 
for w j and Wy. So (15) must be binding. Let Wy = x - b = .5. Then w^ 
solves (by (17)) 
(wi) l /2 = .882 - .5 ( .5 )1/2 = .882 - .353 = .529 
i. e. w j = .280 < X - b. 
We have been able to show that, if 5 is large enough, the junior worker's 
wage is lower than the less able senior worker's, even though the expected 
productivity of the former person is higher than that of the latter one (x and x - b, 
respectively). This is because the junior worker pays for the opportunity of 
accumulating human capital. It has also been showed that wy = w i > x - b is 
possible in an efficient contract. This reflects the insurance aspect of the wage 
contract (see Proposition 1). 
3. A Model of a Hierarchical Firm with Internal Promotion 
The preliminary models in Section 2 throw light on various aspects of the 
wage contract. However the hierarchical structure was kept at a minimum there. 
It was also assumed, without outlining the process of information transmission. 
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that at the end of the first period the worker's ability becomes known (not 
necessarily precisely) to the market. 
We now introduce an explicit hierarchical structure along with a more 
realistic assumption about the market information on senior workers : while the 
employer has a good idea of a worker's ability after employing him for one period, 
the market's judgement of his ability depends on the position he takes in the firm. 
If an individual is recently promoted, this is a signal to the market that he is more 
able than the average worker. For example, suppose workers' ability is uniformly 
distributed within the interval [0, 1], and after one period, the firm promotes the 
top 25% of its employees to the rank of manager. Then the ability of a newly 
promoted worker will be perceived by the market as being somewhere between .75 
and 1, with a mean value of .875. 
It is clear that in this model, the firm unintentionally plays the role of a 
certifying agency : it effectively awards "certification" to its more able employees. 
Since these employees may be lured away by outside firms, to keep them, the 
current firm is forced to pay them wages no less than their market expected 
productivities. One may ask : "why does the firm promote its able employees, if 
this policy makes it suffer?". A partial answer is that hierarchy plays an important 
role in production. The firm needs some of its employees to perform the activities 
of decision-making, coordination, and supervision. Persons who have stayed in 
tile firm for a period of time and are regarded as having high abilities are most likely 
to be promoted to high rank positions to perform these tasks."^ 
Another reason, which is outside the model, is that the market has some 
information (other than the position he takes) about the quality of the 
worker. The possibility that the high ability employee is hired away by 
outside firms may force the current firm to promote him (associated with 
wages increase). Under these circumstances pooling equiUbrium can never 
be optimal, see Miyazaki (1977) andBiglaiser (1986). 
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In this Section, it is assumed that all managerial positions are filled by 
internal promotion. The possibilities of recruiting managers from outside firms 
will not be discussed until Section 4. The present purpose is to characterize the 
implicit wage contract given that a certain proportion of junior workers will be 
promoted in the future. A secondary purpose of the model is to show tiiat, in 
general, firms may wish to randomize job assignment, and that this may explain 
why starting salaries are generally the same across job categories, even though in 
later periods the divergence tends to increase. 
3.1 The Basic Assumptions 
We now state the assumptions of our model. Consider a hierarchical firm 
which has three types of jobs. At the beginning of period one, N j + N2 young 
employees are recruited. These workers differ in ability but neither the firm nor the 
young recruits know about each individual's true ability.^ They are therefore 
treated as identical. Of the young employees N^ are assigned to job 1 and N2 
are given job 2. Job 1 has the special characteristics that workers' true abilities will 
never be learnt by the firm tiiere (perhaps because they perform team work). On 
the other hand, if a worker is assigned to job 2, then at the end of period 1 the firm 
knows with certainty his ability (but the firm's knowledge cannot be objectively 
documented). Assume that abilities are to be drawn from a uniform distribution 
witia upper and lower values / / and L . The distribution can be thought of as a 
common knowledge to the market, say from schooling. The expected ability 
(productivity) of a young employee is then 
X = ( H + L ) / 2 
5 If employees have information about their abiUties, then a testing model 
(self-selection) is suitable for analyses. 
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At the beginning of period 2, senior workers retire and young employees 
become senior. The senior job-1 employee will have accumulated skills on the job 
and his expected output in period 2 is assumed to be x + s, where ^ > 0. Let the 
job-1 employee's first period wage and second period wage be denoted as w j i 
and W12, respectively (where the first subscript denotes job type, and the second 
subscript denotes period). As for the job-2 employees, since their abilities are 
learnt by the firm, a fraction N3 / N2 of them will be promoted to the rank of 
managers (to perform the tasks of management) while the remaining workers serve 
as senior job-2 employees. Their second period wages are denoted by Wj^ and 
respectively (the subscripts m and d stand for "made it" and "did not make 
it", respectively). A finer partition which allows the firm to have many grades of 
managers and senior job-2 employees would seem more realistic, but this only 
results in increased complexity without adding further insight 
The organizational chart is depicted in Figure 6. The downward arrows 
indicate the direction of control while the upward arrows signify career paths. 
Notice that the supervision of all senior employees (including managers) is not 
specified here. It can be simply assumed that they will work "properly" since they 
have stayed at tiie firm for a period. However, adding more layers would not 
change the qualitative results. 
Given the promotion ratio N3/N2 = p, and assuming that workers at the 
top end (and not the bottom end) of the distribution are promoted, the expected 
ability of a manager is 
(1 /2) [a* + H] = H" (20) 
where a* is the cut-off ability level, as given by 
( a * - L ) / ( H - a * ) = ( l - p ) / p (21) 
which gives 
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a* = ( 1 - p ) H + pL. (21') 
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between a* and p. 
The managers and the junior workers jointly produce an output Q^. 
Assume that this output is positive if and only if there are managers (i. e. the 
managers' roles as the coordinator and supervisor are indispensable in producing 
Ql), and that it is an increasing function of the manager's expected ability H". 
This is formalized as as follows : 
/ 0 if N3 = 0 (22a) 
Ql = \ 
- ( Ni X + N2 X ) + 0 H" N3 if N3 > 0 (22b) 
where 0 is a positive-valued function which transforms the manager's ability into 
physical outputs. 
The output produced by senior job-1 and job-2 employees is 
Q2 = ( X + s ) Ni + L" ( N2 - N3 ) (23) 
where L" is the average ability of senior job-2 employees : 
L" = ( L + a* ) / 2. (24) 
Summing up, (22) and (23) give the expected life-time output of any 
cohort of new recruits (the assumption that the rate of interest is zero is retained, 
the introduction of a positive rate of interest would not affect our essential results): 
Ni X + Ni (X s ) + N2 X -H N3 0 H" + ( N2 - N3) L" 
= N i ( 2 x + s ) + N2 X + N 2 [ p K " + (1 -p ) L"] (25) 
where K" = H" 0 , p = N 3 / N 2 . 
In order to focus on the wage structure, it is assumed that the ratio 
N 3 / N 2 and N3/(Ni-i-N2) are exogenous, perhaps reflecting fixed-coefficient 
technology. The "scale" of the fmn, Ni + N2, is either fixed, or freely variable 
but indeterminate due to the zero profit assumption (this is achieved via the market 
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adjustment of UQ, the worker's reservation utility, but this process is not modeled 
here). 
We assume that the firm offers a rwo-period tenure contract to its new 
recruits (thus the possibility of dismissal is ignored here), and that, while the 
contract binds the firm, the employees are free to leave after working for one 
period. In order to keep its workers in the second period of their working life, the 
firm must offer them a wage no less than their outside opportunity cost. The non-
quitting constraints are: 
Wm > H"; (26a) 
wd > L"; (26b) 
and 
W12 ^ X + s. (26c) 
The above constraints reflect the assumption that the market's perception of 
the abilities of the employees of the firm depends entirely on their positions within 
the firm. Notice also that, in general, K" ^ H", because the marginal product of 
a manager within the firm depends on the factor 0 , which is firm-specific. 
In order to attract young employees the firm must offer an expected utility 
level not less than the reservation utility over two periods, 2Uo. This reservation 
utility may be thought of as the competitive market price of contracts for young 
employees. It is assumed that UQ ^ U(x), which is reasonable since x is the 
young employee's expected productivity before he enters the market 
Under tiie assumption that the employee is required to stay witii the firm for 
one period after the contract is signed, clearly it is in the firm's interest to allocate 
jobs to tiie new recruits on a random basis. To see this, notice tiiat, if jobs were 
to be specified before the contracts were offered, the firm would have to meet two 
participation constraints : 
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U ( w n ) + U(wi2) > 2Uo; (27a) 
and 
U(w2i) + p U(wm) + (1 - p) U(wd) > 2Uo. (27b) 
On the other hand, with random assignment of jobs only one constraint is 
necessary: 
( l - q ) [ U ( w i i ) + U ( w i 2 ) ] 
+ q [ U(w2i) + p U(wm) + (1 - p) U(wd)] > 2Uo. (28) 
where q = N2 / (N^ + N2) is the probability that a young employee is allocated 
to job 2. Any wage package that satisfies (27a) and (27b) will satisfy (28), but 
not vice versa. Therefore (28) gives the firm a larger feasible set 
32 Analysis 
The firm wishes to maximize the expected profit (25) from any given 
cohort of employees subject to the constraints (26a), (26b), (26c) and (28). The 
Lagrangean function of the firm's problem is 
£ = ( N i + N 2 ) { ( l - q ) ( 2 x + s) + q [ x + p K" + (1 - p) L" ] 
- ( l - q ) ( w i i + W12) - q [ w 2 i + p w ^ + (1 - p ) w d ] } 
+ 111 { (1 - q) [ U(wii) + U(wi2) ] + q [ U(w2i) + p U(Wni 
+ (1 - p) U(wd) ] - 2Uo } + 1^2 (wm - H") + 1^3 ( w j - L") 
+ - X - s). (29) 
Details of the firm's optimality conditions are provided to Appendix HIB. 
The main results are stated here and some intuitive explanation is offered. 
Proposition 4. The first period wages for the two jobs are equalized : 
w i l = W21. (30) 
This result is due to the assumption that the firm assigns jobs to young 
employees on a random basis. There is no deliberate sorting, because ex ante all 
employees are perceived to be identical. The equality of die first period wages is 
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simply a reflection of the efficiency condition of cost minimization. Figure 8 is 
used to iUustrate the argument. First period wages for job 1 and 2 are measured 
along the horizontal and vertical axis respectively. For given values of other 
variables, die slope of the iso-cost line of Lhe firm is 
dw2i /dwii = - (1 - q ) / q , 
while the slope of the indifference curve of the employee is 
dw2i/dwii = - (1 -q ) U ' ( w i i ) / q U ' ( w 2 i ) . 
The two slopes must be equal at the optimum. This implies 
U ' (wi i ) = U'(w2i) 
and hence, by the strict concavity of U, 
w i i = w 2 i . 
The next result concerns the wage profiles for employees assigned to job 1 
and 2, respectively. 
Propositions. Forjob-2 employees, the optimal wages are 
(I) wm = H" > W21, 
(II) Either w^j = L" > W2i or w^j = W2i ^ L"; 
For job-1 employees, 
(HI) W12 = X + s > w j i {even when s = 0), 
(IV) w j i < X. 
The fact that w j^^  does not exceed H" is easily explained in terms of 
insurance : If Wj^ = H" + e (where e > 0) were set, the firm would be able 
to reduce cost, without violating the participation constraint, through cutting 
by e and increasing w j by an amount smaller than e . Part (II) of Proposition 
5 can also be explained by appealing to the desirability of income smoothing. In 
general the wage profiles (I) and (II) confirm our intuition stated before that the 
promotion prospect provided by the hierarchical firm may give an explanation on 
the upward sloping of wages-tenure profile. 
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Now turning to the wage profile for job 1, why is w ^ smaUerthan x? If 
s > 0, this may be explained by appealing to the literature of human capital 
accumulation and on-the-job training. But the result holds even if s = 0. 
Therefore we must seek a different explanation. Take the simplest case where s 
= 0. Then the expected life-rime utility of a worker assigned to job 1 is U(x) + 
U(wii) , which is smaller than 2U(x). Suppose the worker's reservation utility 
level equals U(x), then the fact that the participation constraint (28) holds with 
equality implies a worker who is assigned to job 2 must have expected life-time 
utility greater than 2U(x). This means that ex ante (before the allocation of jobs 
to employees) all employees are equally treated, thus they are not against the 
random assignment, but ex post, some get better jobs tiian others. One problem 
arises immediately : once assigned, a worker who gets job 1 may be aware that he 
has no "future career" to stay in the firm. However, workers cannot quit in the 
first period, and constraint (26c) ensures that workers will not quit in the second 
period. We have the case of "equals not being treated equally". This arises 
because of a combination of two factors : fixed coefficient technology and the threat 
of quitting. 
Notice also that if an employee earns w^j < x and wi2 = x, it is not 
true that he earns less than his "marginal product" -: we have assumed that his 
product is positive if and only if there is supervision (see (22a) and (22b)), thus 
tiie worker's marginal product is not isolated from the organization structure here. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In the model of Section 3, it was assumed that the ratios N 2 / N 3 and 
N3 / (Ni H- N2) are technologically given. This can be relaxed at the cost of some 
additional complexity. 
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A more crucial assumption is that all N3 managerial positions are filled by 
internal promotion (i. e. the promotion ratio is fixed at N3 /N2) . An altemative 
assumption would be that only those employees whose abilities are revealed to be 
higher than a predetermined level will get promotion (and other managers may be 
recruited from outside). In this case, the ability level required for promotion cannot 
be less than that of the internal promotion as (21') has indicated (otherwise there 
would be more candidates than vacancies available). This means the job-2 
employees have poorer promotion prospect than that under tiie internal promotion. 
To compensate for this the optimal wages-tenure profile must be steeper than before 
(though it is still upward sloping). When the ability of outside recruited managers 
and their wage costs are taken into account the profit function and the whole 
formulation would have to be modified accordingly. 
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Appendix n i A 
Proof that t U(x) + (1 -t) U(y) > U(t x + (1 -1) y) if t > 1. 
For all X, y and t ^ 0 the following identity holds : 
X = (1 - 1 / t ) y + (1/t) [ x + ( t - 1) ( x - y ) ] . 
If t > 1, then the aix)ve equation says that x is a convex combination of y and z, 
where z = x + (t-1) (x -y ) . The weights are stricdy positive and small than 
unity. So 
t U(x) + (1 -1) U(y) 
= t U [ ( l - l / t ) y + (1/t) (X + ( t - 1 ) ( x - y ) ) ] + ( 1 - t ) U(y) 
> [ t ( l - l / t ) U(y) + U(x + ( t - 1 ) ( x - y ) ) ] + ( 1 - t ) U(y) 
= U [ t x + ( l - t ) y ] 
where the strict inequality follows from the strict concavity. 
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Appendix IIIB 
Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 
From (29), N^ + N2 is a multiplicative constant and can be normalized at unity. 
The necessary conditions are 
a £ / a w i i = - ( l - q ) + ^ i i ( l - q ) U ' ( w i i ) = 0 (A l ) 
a£/awi2 = - (1-q) + ^tl(l-q) U ' (wi2 ) +[14 = 0 (A2) 
9£/aw2i = - q + ^il q U ' (w2i ) = 0 (A3) 
a£/awd = -q (1-p) + q (1-p) U' (wd) + 1^3 = 0 (A4) 
a£/awni = - q p + III q p U' (wm) + \i2 = ^ (A5) 
m { ( l - q ) [ U ( w n ) + U ( w i 2 ) ] + q [ U ' ( w 2 i ) 
+ (1-p) U' (wd) + p U' (wm) ] - 2Uo } = 0 (A6) 
1^2 (wm - H") = 0 (A7) 
^ i 3 ( w d - L " ) = 0 (A8) 
I^4 (wi2 - X - s) = 0 (A9) 
and iii > 0 (i = 1,2,3,4). (AlO) 
From (A l ) and (A3) 
111 = 1 / U ' ( w i i ) = 1/U ' (w2i ) > 0. ( A l l ) 
this implies 
^11 - ^21- ( A i r ) 
thus proving Proposition 4. 
Moreover, ( A l l ) implies that the participation constraint (28) holds with 
equality. This is as expected, because if the constraint did not bind, the firm 
would be able to increase the profit by marginally reducing first period wages 
without violating any constraints. 
Substituting ( A l l ) into (A2) yields 
!i4 = (1-q) [1 - U ' ( w i 2 ) / U ' ( w i i ) ] > 0. (A12) 
which implies 
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= 0 only if w^i = wi2 > x + s (A13) 
|i4 > 0 only if w ^ j < wi2 = x + s. (A13') 
Substituting (Al l ) into (A4) yields 
= q ( l - p ) [ l - U ' ( w d ) / U ' ( w 2 i ) ] > 0 (A14) 
implying 
= 0 only if W2i = w^ > L" (A15) 
> 0 only if W2i < w^ = L". (A15') 
Similarly, using (Al l ) in (A5) yields 
1^2 = q p [1 - U'(wn,) / U'(w2i) ] > 0. (A16) 
therefore 
|I2 = 0 only if W2i = w ^ > H" (A 17) 
M.2 > 0 only if W2i < w^ = H". (A17') 
The combination (113 > 0, |I2 = 0) is not possible, for it implies L" > H". 
This leaves three possible combinations of |i2 and [13 : 
(I) IJ.3 = 0, 112 = 0, implying 
wm = wd = W21 >H"; (A18) 
(n) IJ.3 = 0, |I2 > 0, implying 
Win = H" > W21 and w^ = W2i > L"; (A 19) 
and 
(ni) 113 > 0, ^2 > implying 
Wjn = H" > W21 and w^j = L" > W2i. (A20) 
Consider (A13) and (A18). Taking into account (AIT), these two conditions 
yield the flat wage profile : 
wm = wd = W21 = W12 = w i i > H" 
which would imply that the expected life-time utility is at least 2U(H") > 2U(x) 
> 2\JQ, contradicting the fact that ^ > 0 by (All) . Thus the flat wage profile 
is not optimal. 
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Next, consider (A13) and (A19). Again, expected life-time utility 
exceeds 2U(x), contradicting (All). The combination of (A 13) and (A20) 
can also be ruled out because it implies L" > x. 
This eliminates (A13). Now investigate the combinations formed by 
(A13') and (A18) - (A20). It is clear that the combination formed by (A13') and 
(A18) contradicts the result that the participation constraint (28) holds with 
equality. It follows that the optimal wage structure must satisfy the following 
properties 
wm = H" > W21 = w i i (A21) 
wi2 = X + s > Wji = W21 (A22) 
and either 
wd = L" > W21 (A23) 
or wd = W21 > L". (A23') 
Which one of (A23) and (A23') holds? This clearly depends on the parameters 
of the model, because tiie crucial element is that the participation constraint (28) 
must hold with equality. 
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CHAPTER rV 
SUPERVISION, IMPERFECT DIVISIBILITY OF WORK TIME AND 
LAYOFFS IN A SIMPLE HIERARCHICAL FIRM 
1. Introduction 
When a person is employed by a firm, there are two reasons why he may 
lose his job in the future. One is due to personal reasons such as low productivity, 
shirking, etc. : he is "sacked" by the firm. The other is due to external factors 
beyond the individual's control, for example, changes in economic situations such 
as slumps in output prices which cause the firm to adopt "layoffs" as an adjustment. 
These two sources of separation are considered in two different strands of literature. 
The first strand is concerned with monitoring or supervision. In the pioneering 
work of Williamson (1967) and Calvo and Wellisz (1979), the focus is on the 
problem of the size of a firm. Workers must be supervised to maintain production, 
but supervisors also need surveillance in the performance of their supervisory roles. 
This raises the problem of the optimal organizational structure of a firm. More 
serious simations emerge as the moral hazard (hidden action) problem of both 
workers and supervisors is taken into consideration. This leads to interpret the 
hierarchical structure of the firm as the result of an attempt to solve the incentive 
problem (Singh (1985), Tirole (1986), Bohn (1987)). 
The second strand of literature is known as the implicit contract theory. 
Moral hazard is assumed away, and supervision is absent. The firm is assumed to 
be subject to random fluctuations in demand which may cause variations in 
employment. The focus is on the risk-sharing aspects of employment contracts 
(Rosen (1985), Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Taylor (1987)). Employees are 
keen to maintain job security -- stable wage incomes and stable employment, 
because their main wealth is human capital which makes the diversification of their 
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"portfolio" impossible. It is the insurance activity (in addition to the traditional 
production activity) provided by the firm to its workers that constitutes part of the 
contractual relationship between firms and workers (Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983)). 
The shift of risk from more risk-averse workers to the less risk-averse firm creates a 
divergence between the workers' wages and their marginal value products, and 
forces the labour contract to compromise between stable employment and stable 
wage rates. 
The purpose of this chapter is to pull together these two strands of literature. 
At first glance it may seem that there is no connection between them. However, 
scrutinizing the nature of hierarchical firms leads one to suspect that some 
connections exist. A well known characteristic of the hierarchical firm is the 
existence of supervision. One of the supervisory functions is to monitor the 
worker's performance and determine the continuity or termination of employment 
relationships. The simple hierarchy where the owner is the entrepreneur who 
supplies capital service and employs labour to produce a commodity (or service) 
provides a good example on this. As the residual claimant the entrepreneur must 
allocate his time among different activities such as planning, coordination, 
supervision, etc. The degree of supervision a worker faces is determined by two 
factors : one is the time the entrepreneur spends in the activity of monitoring, the 
other is the number of workers employed by the firm. The latter factor depends on 
the state of demand. Long monitoring time means a tight degree of supervision, 
while other tilings being equal, a large number of workers implies a low degree of 
supervision. Suppose an external shock such as a slump in output prices occurs. 
The hierarchical firm may accommodate this by laying its workers off as suggested 
by the implicit contract tiieory. This kind of adjustment means, ceteris paribus, a 
tighter degree of supervision for tiie workers stiU employed and shirking can be 
more easily noticed. Hence a worker's probabiUty of losing his job increases in 
adverse states of nature. Moreover, the possibility of taking discretionary 
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behaviour such as shirking makes supervision inevitable and this involves 
supervision costs to the entrepreneur. How is the wage package offered by the 
firm affected when the above simations are taken into consideration? Does the 
insurance activity suggested by the impUcit contract theory still hold? The purpose 
of this chapter is an attempt to construct a model characterizing a simple hierarchical 
firm and to answer these questions. 
The findings of this chapter are somewhat similar to that of Foster and Wan 
(1984). They show that involuntary unemployment and variations in wages may 
coexist in the optimal contract when the principal-agent relationship is taken into 
account. In their model the firm does not supervise workers, but offers different 
wage packages in different states of nature to induce the workers to work hard. To 
implement this policy requires the individual's output to be observable by the firm. 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show that when supervision is imposed by the firm as 
a discipline device to workers, involuntary unemployment is a necessary condition 
for an equilibrium. However, the model developed below takes the states of 
nature into consideration, a feature which is absent in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The next section builds a 
basic model of a simple hierarchical firm where supervision exists. To investigate 
its properties it will be compared with the symmetric information implicit contract 
model. The property of the optimal contract will be discussed in Section 3. In 
Section 4 the divisibility of work hours restriction is added to the model, and it is 
shown that the possibility of layoffs cannot be eliminated even when work-sharing 
is allowed 
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2. The Basic Model 
This section builds a model of an authority relationship between the 
employer and the employees of a hierarchic firm. The following assumptions are 
made. 
Assumption 1. The firm is a two layer hierarchy. The owner, who is the 
entrepreneur, hires workers to produce goods. He performs all the tasks required 
to maintain the firm except production which is performed by the workers. 
Assumption 2. Workers are of equal ability/quality, thus die effects of differential 
abilities on the firm's decisions are ignored. 
Assumption 3. The owner is risk-neutral, and the workers are risk-averse. 
Assumption 4. The owner contracts a pool of m identical workers at date 0, and 
employment and production occur at date 1. When production begins the worker 
employed may contemplate the possibility of shirking, and will shirk if the 
expected utility of doing so (taking into account the possibility of being caught and 
sacked) exceeds the certain utility of remaining employed, without shirking. 
Assumption 5. The marginal product of a worker is constant and equal to one if he 
works, and equal to zero if he shirks. 
The assumption is, of course, a simplified one. In business texts the 
supervisor is expected to perform many tasks such as communication, 
coordination, motivation, coaching, etc.l In the economics literature supervisors 
(or monitors) are employed by the firm to gather information about a worker's 
effort when individual output is not observable (Calvo and Wellisz (1979), Singh 
(1985), Bohn (1987)). This indicates that the supervisory role is assumed to 
increase work effort and to raise output marginally. In this paper the owner 
performs aU the tasks except production (Assumption 1). One may think he 
1 For example, Schlesinger (1982, p.25) lists seventeen items of 
traditional supervisory role. 
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spends a proportion of his time in monitoring so that the output can be kept at a 
certain level, and spends other time in planning, coordination, etc^ This 
simplification allows investigation of the effect of imposing supervision on an 
employee's total wage package (rather than the variation of wage income subject to 
different information collected tiirough monitoring, see Bohn (1987) on this 
aspect). 
Assumption 6. Botii the firm and the workers have an implicit understanding that 
some workers may be laid off in bad states. To simplify tiie analysis, suppose 
there are only two states. State one denotes good times so that all m workers 
contracted are employed, state two denotes bad times where layoffs may occur, 
and only a proportion q (< 1) of m workers are employed. 
Assumption 7. There is no unemployment compensation paid by the firm to those 
laid off. 
Assumption 8. The output market is competitive; moreover, free entry prevents 
the firm from earning excess profits in the long run. 
The model can now be formulated. When the contract is signed at date 0 
the probability of which state will occur at date 1 is known to both parties, these 
probabilities are denoted as TCj and K2 for state one and state two respectively 
(Til + K2 = 1). The corresponding output prices and wages are pi , p2 
(P1 > P2) '^2. The firm hires workers to produce, tiius it has wage 
costs. In addition, as has been indicated in Assumption 4 and 5, the owner must 
spend time to prevent the workers from shirking. This involves (implicit) costs to 
the owner. Let the amount be c (> 0).3 The firm's expected profit from hiring 
It may be thought that the firm uses supervision as a tool to convince the 
worker that the monitoring system is effective (so as to prevent shirking), 
rather than using it to collect the information about the worker's work 
effort. 
The size of it can be thought of as determined by the owner's ability 
which is not discussed in the model. 
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the workers is : 
E(7I:) = TCI (P1 m - w i m) + 712 (P2 q m - W2 q m) - c (1) 
To attract the worker to sign the contract, the wage-employment terms 
offered by the firm must satisfy the participation constraint that the worker's 
expected utility from joining the firm is no less than Uo, the market clearing level. 
The utility derivable from joining the firm is uncertain. In state one the worker is 
sure to get w^ since there is complete certainty of employment In state two a 
worker has a probability <7 (< 1) to stay in his job and earn W2. On the other 
hand, if he is laid off, he has the utility U(z) obtainable from an outside 
opportunity. The latter may be employment in a spot market where an individual 
can earn a certain amount of income, or may simply be the value of leisure 
associated with unemployment The participation constraint is 
Ki U(wi) + K 2 [ q U(W2) + (1 - q) U(z) ] > UQ (2) 
where we assume z < w ,^ i = 1,2. 
Workers may shirk which causes dramatic decreases in outputs. To 
prevent this, supervision is required by the firm. Define the degree of supervision 
as the ratio of the owner over the number of the workers. Then, it is 
si = 1 / m and S 2 = l / q m 
for state one and two, respectively. The degree of supervision Sj determines the 
probability Gj that a shirking worker will be caught (and sacked). For simplicity, 
assume Gj = Sj. To prevent the worker from taking the chance of loose 
supervision to shirk, the firm offers wj and S{ such that the expected utility of 
shirking is no greater than the utility of not shirking in each state. Suppose the 
monetary valuation of leisure derivable from shirking is r , then the non-shirking 
constraint for each state is 
U(wi) > (1 - sj) U(wi + r) Si U(z) i = 1,2. (3) 
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It is assumed thai shirking does not take place even if (3) holds with 
equality. Two points about the non-shirking constraint seem worth noting. First, 
the condition allows die firm to prevent the worker fem shirking in any state of 
nature. Thus the differentiation of information owned by the workers about the 
firm's degree of supervision (and therefore their decisions of shirking) is irrelevant 
here. Secondly, consider the nature of the constraint. Define 
Fi = U(wi) - [ ( 1 - Si) U(wi + r) + SiU(z)] 
The boundary of the constraint is Fj = 0. This yields 
(dsi/dwi)F^=0 = - OFi/awi)/OFi/asi) 
= - [U'(wi) - ( l -S i )U ' (wi + r ) ] / [ U ( w i + r) - U(z) ] < 0 
The relationship of Sj and wj is depicted in Figure 1. To be consistent with the 
non-shirking constraint, the combination of Sj and w^ must be located in the 
shaded area. A point on the boundary locus Fj = 0 has the corresponding non-
shirking constraint binding. Any points above the boundary locus have higher wj 
than that of boundary locus for a given level of Sj, which results in Fj > 0 and 
the corresponding constraint not binding. 
Finally, add the constraint that the retention ratio in state two must be not 
greater than 1 : 
q -< 1 (4) 
The problem is to choose m, wi , W2, and q to maximize the objective function 
(1) subject to die constraints (2), (3), and (4)."^  
Before proceeding, it is useful to point out that the basic symmetric 
information implicit labour contract model (Azariadis (1975), (1979)) is a special 
case of our model. It assumes that the firm can costiessly supeivise the workers to 
prevent them from shirking. Under these circumstances, setting c = 0 in this 
The problem is not Unear in m because of constraint (3), tiierefore the 
indeterminacy problem of firm size (which is not of interest here) is 
avoided. 
87 
W; 
Figure 1 
88 
model and deleting the non-shirking constraint (3), yields the following much 
simplified implicit contract problem 
max E(7C) = 7Ci (pi m - w j m) + 7C2 ( P2 q m - W2 q m ) 
subject to 
TCI U(wi ) + [ q U(w2) + (1 - q) U(z) ] > U^ (5) 
q ^ 1- (6) 
The first-order conditions for the above problem are (assuming w^ and q 
are strictly positive): 
m / U ' ( w i ) = m / U ' ( w 2 ) = B (7) 
712 m { p2 - W2 + [ U(w2) - U(z) ] / U'(w2) } - x = 0 (8) 
where B and A: are the multipliers on constraint (5) and (6), respectively. 
Condition (7) shows that, at an optimum, w^ = W2, i. e. the worker's wage is 
state-invariant. Equation (8) indicates that 
X = 7T:2m{p2 - W2 + [ U(w2) - U(z) ] / U'(w2) } > 0. 
By complementary slackness the necessary condition for layoffs to occur (q < 1) 
is J: = 0, which occurs at the point 
P2 - W2 - [U(W2) - U(z ) ] /U ' (w2) . (9) 
The optimal contract provides workers with an insurance policy that contains some 
unemployment and stabilization of the earnings of employed workers. Equation 
(9) has two implications. First, it indicates that the marginal value product of 
labour, p2 (since marginal product is assumed to be one), is less than wages in 
bad times, i. e. the worker receives an indemnity from the firm in the adverse state 
of nature; and the equilibrium employment level is above the "reference" level 
which equates marginal value product of labour to the wage. Secondly, the 
5 In a more general version, one would replace pi m by pi f(m), and p2 
q m by p2 f(qm), where f is a concave production function. 
However, for the present purpose, nothing essential is lost by assuming 
that f is linear. 
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second term on the right-hand-side of equation (9) can be expressed in terms of the 
degree of risk aversion : 
[U(W2) - U(z)]/U '(w2) = (W2 - z) (w2 - z ) 2 a / 2 
where A = - U"(w2) / U'(w2) > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk 
aversion. Substituting the above expression in (9) yields 
P2 = z - (W2 - z ) 2 A / 2 . (9') 
This result indicates that a high value of z , the monetary value of outside 
opportunity, or a low degree of risk aversion. A, makes involuntary layoffs more 
likely to happen. Notice that the value of z must be large enough in this model in 
order to explain the existence of involuntary layoffs. 
3. The Optimal Contract With Non-Shirking Constraint 
In the real world, shirking is possible, and this makes supervision 
necessary. One would expect that the adding of a non-shirking constraint (3) will 
change the picture substantially : if the retention ratio of the labour pool is affected 
by the state of nature, so is tiie degree of supervision which, in turn, will change 
the optimal wages offered in different states. 
We now proceed to analyse our problem. Let 6, |ii and or be the 
multiplier on constraints (2), (3) and (4), respectively, and multiply (3) by Tti 
before forming the Lagrangean function (this simplifies the manipulation). 
Assuming m, wi, q are strictly positive, the first-order conditions are 
m : 7 : i ( p i - w i ) + 7^ 2 (P2 " ^2 ) q - ^i^ri [ U(wi + r) - U(z) ] / m 
- H 2 : c 2 [ U ( w 2 + r ) - U ( z ) ] / q m 2 = 0 (10) 
w j : - TTi m -I- 6 Til U ' (wi) 
-h m 7 i i [ U ' ( w i ) - ( l - s i ) U ' ( w i + r ) ] = 0 (11) 
W2: -K2qm + B7t2qU'(w2) 
+ \ i 2 n 2 l U'(W2) - (1- S2) U'(w2 + r) ] = 0 (12) 
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q : K2 (P2 - W2) m + B 712 [ U(w2) - U(z) ] 
- \ l2 7Z2l U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] (S2 / q) - x = 0 (13) 
plus the complementary slackness condition : 
X > 0, and x ( 1 - q ) = 0. 
In the long run free entry ensures the firm cannot earn excess profits. Thus we 
have an additional equilibrium condition : 
(P1 - w i ) m + 712 (P2 - W2) q m - c = 0. (14) 
From (14) 
c / m = 7Ui(pi - w j ) + 7C2(P2 - W2) q. 
Substituting this into (10) yields 
c = iiiTUi [ U ( w i + r) - U(z) ] / m 
+ H2 [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] / q m (14') 
which determines the optimal number of workers contracted as long as wj, q 
and c are known. Since c is positive, (14') indicates that at least one of the \i[ 
must be stricdy positive. From (12) 
B = { q m - H2 [ U'(w2) - (1 - S2) U'(w2 + r) ] } / q U'(w2). 
Substituting into (13) yields 
x = 712 m { P2 - W2 + [ U(w2) - U(z) ] / U'(w2) 
- H 2 B / q m } > 0 (15) 
where 
B = S2 [ U(w2 + r) - U(z)] + [ U'(w2) - (1 - S2) U'(w2 + r) ] 
[ U ( w 2 ) - U ( z ) ] / U ' ( w 2 ) > 0. 
Thus layoffs are possible, and occur at the point 
P 2 = W2 - [ U(W2) - U(z) ] / U'(W2) + ^ 2 B / q m. (16) 
I f | I2 = 0 i. e. i f the non-shirking constraint is not binding in state two, then 
(16) reduces to 
P2 = W2 - [ U(W2) - U(z) ] / U'(w2) ] 
which is just the layoff condition of the impUcit contract model as has been shown 
in (9). I f j i 2 > then from (16) we know 
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P2 - W2 = - [ U(w2) - U(z) ] /U'(W2) + H 2 B / q m >< 0 
i. e. the employment level may be above/below the reference level. Moreover, B 
can be simplified as : 
B = M / U'(W2) 
where 
M = S2 [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] U'(w2) 
+ [ U(W2) - U(z) ] [ U'(W2) - (1 -82) U'(W2 + r) ]. 
The binding non-shirking constraint for state two implies 
U(W2) = (1 - S2) U(W2 4- r) + S2 U(z) 
which implies 
U(W2 -H r) - U(z) = S2 [ U(w2 r) - U(z) ] + U(w2) - U(z) 
and also 
U(W2) - U(z) = (1 - S2) [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ]. 
Substituting the above two expressions into M yields 
M = ( S2 [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] U'(w2) + S2 [ U(w2) - U(z) ] U'(w2) 
+ (1-S2) [U(w2-Hr)-U(z)] U'(W2) 
- (1 - S2 [ U (W2 + r) - U(z) ] U'(W2 + r) 
= { 52^ [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] + S2 (1 - S2) [ U(w2 + r) - U(z) ] 
+ (1 - S2) [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] } U'(w2) 
- (1 - S2)2 [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] U'(w2 r) 
= [ U(W2 -H r) - U(z) ] U'(W2) - (1 - 52)^ [ U(w2 + r) - U(z) ] U'(w2 + r) 
= [ U(W2 r) - U(z) ] [ U'(W2) - (1 - S2) ^ U'(w2 r) ]. 
Hence 
B = [ U(W2 + r) - U(z) ] [1 - (1 - S2)2 U'(w2 + r) / U'(w2)]. 
Now the layoff condition (16) can be expressed as 
P2 = z - ( w 2 - z ) 2 a / 2 -h ( | i 2 / q m ) [ U ( w 2 + r ) - U ( z ) ] 
[ l - ( l - S 2 ) 2 U ' ( w 2 + r ) / U ' ( w 2 ) ] . 
The existence of the last term in the above equation indicates that, if the non-
shirking constraint for state two is binding (which makes the worker indifferent 
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between shirking or non-shirking) then, in addition to z and A, other 
considerations may affect the firm's decision on layoffs : |i2 / qm is the per 
worker's shadow costs of imposing supervision; [ U(w2 + r) - U(2) ] is the excess 
utility a worker exploits from a firm if he joins it but shirks. High values of these 
two terms also make layoffs more likely to occur. Notice also that layoffs are 
possible here even when z , the money value from outside opportunity, is zero. 
The above results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Propostion 1. With the existence of supervision (1) An optimal contract may 
provide for layoffs in state two (the bad state); (2) The level of employment is not 
ex post socially efficient: the firm's marginal value product of labour may be 
greater or less than wages; (3) Layoffs may occur even if the money value of 
leisure is zero. 
Now turn to check whether the optimal wage is fully insured. The optimal 
wage is affected by the non-shirking constraint, so there are four possibilities to 
discuss. 
(1) m > 0, 1^2 > 0 
This is the case where the non-shirking constraint is binding in both states. From 
the propeny of the non-shirking constraint, it means the optimal combination of 
(s, w) must simated on the boundary locus with Bsj/Bwi < 0 for all i. As 
indicated before layoffs may occur in state rwo which implies si (= 1 / m) < S2 
(=1 / q m ) . Hence at equilibrium wi > W2. In Figure 2 points a and b 
represent the optimal combination of (s, w) for state one and two, respectively. 
(2) > 0, = 0 
Since \i2 = 0, equation (12) implies 
B = m / U ' ( w 2 ) 
and from (14') 
III = c m / 711 [ U(wi + r) - U(z) ]. 
Substituting tiiese two expressions into (11) yields 
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TUim { -1 + U ' (wi ) /U ' (w2) 
+ c [ U'(wi) - (1 - si) U'(wi + r) ] / [ U(wi+ r) - U(z) ] } = 0. 
The last term in the parenthesis is positive, thus 
U ' (wi) /U ' (w2) < 1 
which implies w j > W2. 
(3) = 0, I^2 > 0 
Since = 0, equation (11) implies 
B = m / U ' ( w i ) 
and (15) implies 
^12 = cqm /7U2 [U(w2 + r) - U ( z ) ]. 
Substituting the above two expressions in (12) yields 
:u2qm { -1 + U'(w2)/U'(wi) 
+ c [ U ' ( W 2 ) - ( 1 - S 2 ) U ' ( W 2 + r ) ] / 7 1 2 [ U ( w 2 + r ) - U ( z ) ] } = 0 
The last term in the parenthesis is positive, so U'(w2) / U'(wi) < 1 which 
implies W2 > wj . Now from the property of the non-shirking constraint, 
)J,2 > 0 implies the combination of (S2, W2) must be located on the boundary 
locus of the constraint, e.g. at point b' in Figure 3; and M-i = 0 so (sj, w^) 
must be located above the boundary locus for any given level of wage, e.g. at point 
a' (since W2 > w^). Comparing a' with b' implies si > S2 which 
contradicts the assumption that q < 1 (and si < S2 always hold). Thus this 
case is impossible. 
(4) m = 0, ^l2 = 0 
This case is not possible either. Because, from the preceding discussion, one of 
the fj-i must be positive (see equation (14')). 
The above results are summarized in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2. With the existence of the possibility of shirking and the necessity of 
supervision (1) At an optimum the non-shirking constraint for state one (the good 
state) is always binding, while it may or may be not binding for state two (the bad 
state); (2) The optimal wage for state one is greater than that for state two, i.e. 
w j > W2. 
The result is in sharp contrast to the conclusion of the symmetric-
information implicit contracting model, that the rigidity of wages and fluctuations in 
employment are essentially the by-product of the trade-off between productive 
efficiency and risk-sharing. Propositions 1 and 2 show that, with the existence of 
supervision, both employment and risk-sharing do not meet the usual efficiency 
conditions. 
4. Divisibility of Work Time And Layoffs 
The above model is incomplete in the sense that work time does not play any 
role in the analysis. In this section it is added into die worker's utility function and 
the firm's production technology; and the way in which full or partial divisibility of 
work time will affect the early conclusions is investigated. Lovenstein (1983) 
argues that if the employees' work hours are divisible among themselves, then no 
efficient contract provides for layoffs. Intuitively when there are fluctuations in 
output prices, efficiency requires the firm to vary its labour input in response to iL 
This can be achieved through variations in work hours or variations in employment. 
If the firm can costlessly vary hours across its work force, then since 
"no worker prefers one consumption-leisure combination 
during the fraction of his work life that he spends employed 
and another combination during the remaining fraction spent 
unemployed to the average of the two combinations all the time." 
(Lovenstein (1983), p.73.) 
no efficient contract provides for layoffs under this situation. However, when 
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supervision is required to maintain production as specified in the inodel, work-
sharing does impose costs on the firm. The following analysis shows that 
super/ision may result in the occurrence of layoffs, in contrast to the result 
obtained by Lovenstein. 
There are two kinds of personnel in the model: the owner and the workers, 
each performs different tasks and may have different work hours. Let t and h 
denote the owner's and the employee's hours worked during the period, 
respectively. Depending on the technology there are three possibilities. 
Case (A): The employee's work time is divisible, thus it may have different 
values in different states, but the owner's work time is fixed. As an example, the 
owner's supervisory time may be fixed at eight hours a day irrespective of the 
states; in the bad state workers are separated into two groups, each group working 
four hours a day (e. g. morning shift and afternoon shift). 
Case (B) : The employees' work time is divisible and it equals the owner's work 
time, i.e. hj = tj, and in general hj hj = t^  tj for i^tj . This is the case 
that tiie employees must work together at the same time, and shifts are not possible 
(perhaps due to the technology). Thus in the bad state, workers are not separated 
into groups, everyone works, say, four hours a day, and the supervisor works 
four hours a day too. 
Case (C): The employee's work time is indivisible, and each employee has same 
work hours across states, i. e. h^  = h, but h need not equal the supervisor's 
work time. 
These three cases are discussed separately. In all cases the degree of 
supervision is defined as the ratio of \hc owner's hours worked over total work 
hours of the employees, and the output in each state is measured as tiie product of 
number of hours worked per worker times the number of workers in that state. 
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Case (A) The employees' work hours are divisible but not equal to the owner's 
work hours, i. e. h^  ^ t. 
The problem is to maximize 
E(:i) = TUj (pi hi m - w^ m ) + 7C2 (P2 - W2 m) q - c 
where c = c(t) is the owner's opportunity cost of supervision and is assumed to 
be a constant The participation constraint is : 
TCI U(wi + vi) + 7C2 [ q U(W2 + V2) + (1 - q) U* ] > Uq (17) 
where U* is the utility derivable from outside opportunity if an individual is laid 
off by the firm. Define U* = U(RH) where H is the worker's labour 
endowment, R is the outside reservation wage rate (from the spot market or the 
value of leisure); and = R (H - hj) is the worker's valuation of leisure or 
other income derivable from after work time. The non-shirking constraint is 
U(wi + vi) > (1 - Si) U(wi + r + vi) + Si U* for i = 1, 2 (18) 
where s j = t / h ^ m and S2 = t / h 2 q m are the degrees of supervision. And 
the constraint on the retention ratio is 
q < 1. 
Let 6, |ii and x be the corresponding multipliers as before, die first-order 
conditions are (multiplying the non-shirking constraint by n{ to form the 
Lagrangean function, and assuming Wi, hi, m, and q are strictly positive): 
m : TCI (pi hi - ^ l ) (P2 " W2) q - [ U(wi + r + v j ) - U* ] si / m 
-TC2^i2[U(w2+r + V2)-U*] S2/m = 0 (19) 
wi : - Til m + 6 TTi U'(wi vi) + |ii TCi [ U'(wi + vi) 
- ( 1 - s i ) U ' ( w i + r + v i ) ] = 0 (20) 
W 2 : - Ti2 q m + 6 TC2 q U ' ( w 2 + V 2 ) + ^ 2 ^ 2 t U ' ( w 2 + V 2 ) - ( l -S2 )U ' (w2 + r + V2)]= 0 (21) 
hi : T t i P i m - B R 7 C i U ' ( w i + v i ) - T C i } i i { R [ U ' ( w i + v i ) 
- ( l - s i ) U ' ( w i + r + v i ) ] + [ U ( w i + r + v i ) - U * ] s i / h i } = 0 (22) 
h2 : Tt2 P2 q m - 6 R TC2 q U'(w2 + V2) - :i2 1^ 2 ( R t U'(w2 + V2) 
- (1 - S2) U'(W2 + r + V2) ] + [ U(w2 + r + V2) - U*] S2 / h2 } = 0 (23) 
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q: 7Z2 (P2 " ^ 2 ) m + B :c2 [U(w2 + v2) - U* ] 
U(w2 + r + V2) - U*] S2 / q - X = 0 (24) 
plus the complementary slackness condition : 
X > 0, and x (1 - q) = 0. 
In addition, there is the long run equilibrium condition that the excess profit is zero 
7Ci (pi h i - w i ) m + 712 (P2 h2 - W2) m q = c. (25) 
Equation (25) implies 
711 (pi hi - wi) + 7^ 2 (P2 ^2 - W2) q = c / m. 
Substituting this in (19) yields 
c / m = 7Ci iJ-i [ U(wi + r + v i ) - U* ] si / m 
+ 7t2 }i2 [ U(w2 + r + V2) - U* ] S2 / m > 0 (25') 
which determines the optimal number of workers contracted as long as wj, sj, 
and c are known. Multiplying (21) by w 2 / q yields 
W2 m = 6 W2 U'(w2 + V2) + |i2 ^ 2 [ U'(w2 + V2) 
- ( l - S 2 ) U ' ( w 2 + r + V2) ] /q . (21') 
Multiplying (23) by h2 / q, then rearranging yields 
P2 h2 m = B R h2 U'(w2 + V2) + |J.2 ^2 { R [ U'(w2 + V2) - (1 - S2) 
U'(w2 + r + v2)] + [ U ( w 2 + r + V2) -U*] S2/h2 } / q . (23') 
Substituting (21') and (23') in (24), the layoff condition is reduced to 
X = 712 (}i2D/q + BE) (26) 
where 
D = (Rh2 - W 2 ) [ U ' ( w 2 + v 2 ) - ( l - S 2 ) U'(w2 + r + v2)] < 0 
and E = U(w2 + V2) - W2 U'(w2 + V2) + R h2 U'(w2 + V2) - U* > 0. 
The term D is negative because R h2 < W2 must hold (otherwise the worker 
would quit in state two). E > 0 is due to the strict concavity of the utility 
function : By definition 
V2 = R (H - h2), and U* = U(RH), 
so [ U(w2 + V2) - U*] / [ (w2 + V2) - R H ] 
= [ U(w2 + V2) - U*] / (W2 - R h2) > U'(w2 + V2) 
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which implies 
U(w2 + V2) - (w2 - R h2) U'(w2 + V2) - U* = E > 0. 
Now, from equation (26) 
X = 7r2 B E > 0 if |i2 = 0 
and since M-2 = 0 this implies, from (21), B = m/U ' (w2+V2) > 0. This 
result shows that, without the non-shirking constraint (which is equivalent to 
= 0) work-sharing would prevent layoffs from happening. Further 
^ = T^li ^t2D / q + B E ] > 0 if > 0. 
This indicates that x = 0 (and 1 < q) is possible when |I2 > 0. Thus the 
optimal policy may produce layoffs when the non-shirking constraint is binding. It 
is the shadow cost of supervision that makes layoffs possible. Now characterize 
the optimal wages. Define the non-shirking constraint (18) as 
Kj = U(wi -h vi) - (1 - Si) U(wi + r + vj) - Si U* > 0. 
Let the symbol y denote w -i- v, then y is the worker's total income from labour 
endowment. The boundary locus of the constraint, Ki = 0, has the property that 
Ohi/9yi)K^=0 = [ U'(yi) - (1 - Si) U'(yi + r)] /{ [ U'(yi) - (1 - Si) U'(yi + r) ] 
-h[U(yi + r ) - U * ] s i / h i } > 0 
This indicates that yi and hi are positively related when the non-shirking 
constraint is binding. Any combination of (yj, hi) located to the right of the 
boundary locus has higher y than is required for any given h, i. e. the constraint 
is not binding for that combination. Four possibilities are investigated below. 
(1) > 0, 1^2 > 0 
The constraints for both states are binding and the combination of (yi, hi) lies on 
the boundary locus. Thus we have either (y i , h j ) > (y2, h2) or vice versa. 
The former situation implies 
yi = wi + R (H - hi) > y2 = W2 + R (H - h2) 
and 
hi > h2. 
Hence wi > W2 holds, and in general w i / h i ^ w 2 / h 2 , i. e. hourly wages 
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are state-dependent. The same conclusion can be applied symmetrically to the latter 
situation. 
(2) III > 0, = 0 
Since |12 = 0, equation (21) implies 
B = m/U ' (y2) 
and equation (25') implies 
= c/TTi SI [U(yi + r ) - U * ] . 
Using the above two expressions in (20) yields 
m { - l + U ' ( y i ) / U ' ( y 2 ) 
+ c [ U ' ( y i ) - ( l - s i ) U ' ( y i + r ) / 7 t i s i m [ U ( y i + r ) - U * ] } = 0. 
The last term in the parenthesis is stricdy positive, hence 
U ' (y i ) /U ' (y2) < 1 
which indicates 
yi (= w i + R ( H - h i ) ) > y2 (= W2 + R (H - h2)). 
Now since p-i > 0, (yi, h j ) must be located on the boundary locus at a point 
such as c in Figure 4; and if |i2 = 0, (y2, h2) is located to the right of the 
locus at a point such d (since y2 < yi). Comparing those two points shows that 
h i > h2 which implies (by yi > yi) that wi is greater than W2, and in 
general it can be claimed w i / h i ^ W2/h2. 
(3) 1^1 = 0, H2 > 0 
Since }ii = 0, equation (20) implies 
6 = m / U ' ( w i + v i ) 
and equation (22) implies 
B = Pi m / R U ' ( w i + v i ) 
Equating the above two expressions yields pi / R =1, i. e. the output price in 
the good state, pi , equals the worker's hourly earnings from the outside 
opportunity, R. It is clear that this case is impossible, because under these 
circumstances pi = R < wi and the owner will have negative expected profits 
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with such a low output price.6 
(4) = 0, 1^2 = 0 
As has been indicated before, one of the must be strictly positive, hence this 
case is not possible. 
The above results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. When supervision is imposed to maintain production and the 
employee's work hours are divisible (while the supervisor's work time is rigid) an 
efficient contract has the property that (1) it may provide for layoffs; (2) the 
optimal hourly wage is not state-invariant; and (3) the non-shirking constraint for 
state one (the good state) is always binding while it may or may not be binding for 
state two (the bad state). 
Case (B) The employees' work hours are divisible and equal to the owner's work 
hours, i. e. hj = tj. 
In this case the objective function is to maximize 
E(7i) = 711 [ (pi hi m - wi m) - c(hi) ] + 712 [ (P2 h2 m - W2 m) q - c(h2)]. 
The constraints are the same as that of Case (A) except that the degree of 
supervision has different values here : 
s i = ti / h i m = 1 / m , S2 = t 2 / q h2 m = 1 / q m. 
Again let 6, and j: be the corresponding multipliers on constraints (17), (18) 
and (4), respectively. The first-order conditions of (19), (20), (21) and (24) 
This can also be confirmed by the following argument: In (2) jii > 0 
and |I2 = 0, the latter inequality implies (solving equations (21) and 
(23) for B, then equalizing them) p 2 / R = 1. In this case p i / R = L 
If this case were possible, then pi = p2 (= R) must hold, which 
contradicts the assumption that the output price in the good state is greater 
than that in the bad state. The statement indicates that either (2) or (3) 
must be rule. Since there is no reason to exclude the possibility of (2), 
it is (3) that is ruled out. 
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are still applicable. But the optimal conditions for variables hj and h2 change 
into (since 3si/3hi =8s2/3h2 = 0): 
h i : 711 [ PI m - c'(hi) ] - 6 R k i U'(wi + v i ) - tui R [ U'(wi + v i ) 
- ( 1 - s i ) U ' ( w i + r + v i ) ] = 0 (27) 
7C2 [ P2 q - c'(h2) ] - S R 712 U'(w2 + V2) - 712 1^ 2 ^ [ U'(w2 + V2) 
- ( l -S2)U' (w2 + r + v2)] = 0. (28) 
The long run equilibrium condition of zero excess profit is 
7Ci [ (pi h i - w i ) m - c(hi) ] + 7U2 [ (P2 h2 - W2) q m - c(h2) ] = 0. (29) 
From (29) 
7ti (pi h i - w i ) + 712 (P2 h2 - W2) q = [ Tti c(hi) + 712 c(h2) ] / m 
Substituting the above expression in (19) yields 
7ti c(hi) + 712 c(h2) = TCI | i i [ U(wi + r + v i ) - U* ] si 
+ 7C2 IJ.2 [ U(w2 + r + V2) - U*] S2 > 0. (30) 
This determines the optimal value of m as long as wj, Sf, ii[ and c(hi) are 
known. It also indicates that at least one of the fij must be strictiy positive. Now 
multiplying (28) by h2 / q, then rearranging yields 
P2 h2 m = c'(h2) h2 / q + 6 R h2 U'(w2 + V2) 
+ IJ.2 h2 [ U'(w2 + V2) - (1 - S2) U'(w2 + r + V2) ] / q. 
Substituting the above expression and equation (21') (which is still available since 
equation (21) is an optimal condition) in (24) yields the following layoff 
condition: 
X = 7C2[^i2G/q + be + c'(h2)h2/q } (31) 
where E has been defined in Case (B) and 
G = (R h2 - W2) [ U'(w2 + V2) - (1 - S2) U'(w2 + r + V2) 
- [ U(W2 + r + V2) - U*] < 0 
since the first term is negative while the second temi is positive. 
From (31) we know 
X = 7r2[6E + c'(h2)h2/q] > 0 if 1X2 = 0 
and 
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X = ; u 2 [ ^ i 2 G / q + B E + c ' ( h 2 ) h 2 / q ] > 0 if ^2 > 0 
Thus layoffs are also possible in this case. 
Now turn to investigate the optimal wage. Define the non-shirking 
constraint (18) as 
Gi = U(wi + vi) - (1 - Si) U(wi + r + vi) - Si U* > 0 for i = 1, 2 
and again define y = w + v. The boundary of the constraint, Gi = 0, has the 
property that 
Osi/ayi)G,= 0 = - [ U'(yi) - (1 - Si) U'(yi + r) ] / [ U(yi + r) - U*] < 0. 
The following possibilities are investigated : 
(1) III > 0, ^12 > 0 
The preceding result shows that layoffs are possible when |i2 > 0. Thus s j 
(= 1 / m) < S2 (=1 / qm). Meanwhile since both multipliers are positive, they 
must locate on the boundary of Gi = 0. Thus we know y j > y2 i-e. 
[ w j + R (H - h i ) ] > [ W2 + R (H - h2) ], which indicates that, in general, there 
is no guarantee that w j / h j = W2 / h2 must hold. 
(2) m > 0, 1^2 = 0 
Since fi2 = 0, from the preceding analysis it is known that layoffs are never the 
optimal policy, hence s^ = S2. Moreover, it also implies, from equation (21), 
that 
6 = m / U ' ( y 2 ) 
and from equation (30) 
= [Ki c(hi) + 712 c(h2)] / [ U(yi + r ) - U* ] s i . 
Substituting the above two expressions in (20) yields 
7U1 m { -1 + U ' (y i ) / U'(y2) + [ c(hi) + 712 c(h2) ] 
[ U'(y 1) - (1 - s i ) U' (yi + r) ] / 711 [ U(yi + r) - u * ] } = 0 . 
The last term in the parenthesis is stricdy positive, thus 
U ' (y i ) < U'(y2) 
i . e . y i (= w i + v i ) > y2 (= W2 + V2). Now > 0 implies the 
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combination (yj, si) must be located on the boundary locus of the constraint e.g. 
point e in Figure 5, while Ji2 = 0 implies (y2, S2) must be located above the 
boundary locus at a point such as / ( s ince s j = S2) in the diagram. This 
indicates yi < y2 which is a contradiction. Thus we conclude that this case is 
impossible. 
(3) = 0, 1^2 > 0 
Since \i2 > ^ layoffs may occur and si < S2. This also implies (y2, S2) 
must be located on the boundary locus, e. g. at point f on Figure 6. By a 
procedure analogous to (2) = 0 implies yi < y2 (solving B from 
equation (22) and \X2 from (30), then substituting these two expressions in (20) 
to get the result). It also implies the combination (y^, s^) must locate above the 
boundary locus, such as point e' of the diagram (since s j < S2). Comparing 
point e' and / shows yi > y2 which is a contradiction. Thus it can be 
concluded that this case is also not possible. 
(4) 111 = 0, |I2 = 0 
This case is not possible either, because as has been indicated earlier, one of the 
must be strictly positive. 
The above results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. When supervision is imposed to maintain production and die 
employee's work hours are divisible (and equal to the supervisor's work time) an 
efficient contract has the property that (1) it may provide for layoffs; (2) there is 
no guarantee that the hourly wage rate is state-invariant and (3) the non-shirking 
constraints are always binding for both states. 
Case (C) The employees' work time is indivisible, hence each worker has same 
work hours across states, i. e. hi = h which may or may not equal the 
supervisor's work time. This case is similar to that analyzed in Section 2 except a 
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unit of measurement -- the work hour -- is added So all the results derived there 
are still available with only a little change in the explanations. For example, at 
optimum hourly wages in state one are greater than that in state two; and the firm's 
marginal value product of labour may be greater or less than the worker's hourly 
wagesJ 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the two strands of literature on separation of employment 
relationships are drawn together. It has been shown that the implicit contract 
results (e. g. equality of wages across states) must be modified substantially. 
Further, flexibility of work hours does not guarantee the absence of layoffs when 
the role of supervision is explicitiy introduced : this is because the degree of 
effective supervision depends on the ratio of total hours worked and supervision 
time, which is itself costly. Specific relationships between employment and wages 
are also obtained for various cases. 
The model is admittedly a very simple one : The firm has only one layer of 
supervision, and there are only two states. The effect of the relaxation of these 
assumptions is a topic for future research. 
7 The layoff condition is (in contrast to (16)) 
P2 = w 2 / h - [U(w2 + v ) - U * ] / h U ( w 2 + v) + ^ i B ' / h q m 
where 
B' = [ + r + v) - U * ] [ 1 - ( 1 - S2)2 U ' ( W 2 + r + V) / U ' (w2 + v) ]. 
By the same analysis as in Section 2 it can be proved that 
(= wi + v) > y2 (= W2 + v) 
where v = R ( H - h ) , which implies (since the work hour, h, is the same 
across states) 
wi / h > W2/h. 
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CHAPTER V 
FIRM-OFFERED TRAINING, WAGES AND 
EMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between a worker's wage rate and his productivity is one of 
the main concerns of labour economics. Empirical observations show that it is 
possible for a firm to set wage profiles for its workers more steeply sloping than 
their corresponding productivity profiles (Medoff and Abraham (1980)). The 
reason why senior workers receive wage rates higher than their marginal products 
deserves explanation, because it contradicts the prediction of human capital theory. 
In human capital theory if the skills acquired by tiie worker from on-the-job training 
are completely general, the firm is not willing to invest in it (because, after the 
productivity-enhanced training, the worker can either demand a higher wage at the 
current firm or quit and receive outside jobs which pay him according to his 
productivity). Therefore it is profitable for a firm to invest in general training only 
if tiie trainee bears the burden of the training cost, and the trained (senior) worker's 
wage is not greater than his marginal productivity. On the other hand, if the skills 
acquired from the training are specific but still have value to outside firms, then 
sharing the cost and the return of the training is crucial for tiie realization of it. 
Hashimoto ((1979), (1981)) shows that, in equilibrium, as a result of 
maximizing ex ante joint wealtii by the firm and its workers, the wages of the 
trained workers are below their marginal value products during the post-investment 
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period. 1 
Lazear (1979) points out that, even in the aZj^e/ice of on-t he-job training 
(thus the worker's productivity profile is flat), upward sloping earning profiles in 
conjunction with the threat of dismissal for being caught shirking, have positive 
effects on work effort. loannides and Pissarides (1983) provide a model based on 
asymmetric information to explain the phenomenon. They assume that the skills 
accumulated by senior workers are partially firm-specific and the outside offers 
received by the senior workers are not verifiable to the firm. Under these 
circumstances they show that in equilibrium die junior worker's wage is less than 
his marginal value product, while the senior worker's wage is not contingent on the 
report of the outside offer and is greater than his marginal value p r o d u c t ^ 
There is a caveat in the above models in explaining the deviation of wages 
from marginal products. Basically the long-term employment relationship between 
the firm and the workers is built by both parties so that investment in training is 
worth making. However, these models do not specify the way job promotion is 
made in the firm, which clearly affects the worker's expected wage income in his 
working life. Oswald (1984) shows that, in the enterprise's internal labour 
market where workers have the prospect of being promoted from junior status to 
senior status (for unspecified reasons because there is no training offered or ability 
Ohashi <1983) argues that if the quitting of the skilled workers is possible 
(due to either non-pecuniary motives such as job dissatisfaction, or 
pecuniary reasons, such as accepting better outside offers when the skills are 
partially firm-specific), then it is optimal for the firm to set the junior 
worker's wage lower than his marginal value product, and the senior 
worker's wage higher than his marginal value product This is equivalent to 
imposing a penalty on the quitting person. However, see Carmichael's 
comment (1985) on this point. Moreover, it seems worth noting that both 
assume the worker is risk-neutral in their analyses. 
Note that their specification of the worker's Ufe-time utility function is not the 
typical expected utility function. 
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observed by the firm in his model), both senior and junior workers may be paid 
more or less than their marginal value products. 
This chapter analyses the internal labour market with fim-offered training, 
and shows that, under certain circumstances, the human capital theory can be 
consistent with the observation that senior workers receive wages more than their 
marginal value products. In Section 2 a two-period model where the firm offers 
training to its junior workers during the first period is builL Promotion, which is 
not necessarily guaranteed as will be outlined in the text, is then made at the 
beginning of the second period by the firm. Under these circumstances the 
combination of firm-specific skills and the uncertainty about promotion results in the 
deviation of wages from marginal products. In Section 3 the model is extended to 
an enterprise's internal labour market with three levels and a life-time employment 
commitment. It is then shown that the timing of promotion is also crucial in 
determining the optimal wage profile. 
2. The Model 
This section presents a model which characterizes the training offered by the 
enterprise in the internal labour market and the role of promotion decisions on the 
optimal wage profile. 
2.1 Firm-ojfered Training and Production Technology 
Suppose a firm's output depends on the labour services obtained from its 
employees which include two classes of workers : the junior workers who have 
only common skills and need tiding; and senior workers who have been in the 
firm for a period of time and have accumulated skills there. The training offered by 
the firm is assumed to be informal: in the process of production the junior workers 
accept instructions, demonstrations and help from the experienced workers. This 
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assumption is not a special one. Doeringer and Piore (1971) pointed out that 
"for blue-collar manufacturing jobs, the hallmark of on-the-job 
training is its informality. The process is variously described 
as 'osmosis , 'exposure', 'experience', or 'working one's 
way up through promotion.' "(p. 18). 
For some white-collar jobs such as clerks, low-level managers, and 
programmers this assumption is also applicable (see, for example, Osterman 
(1984)). One implication of the assumption is that the cost of human investment in 
skill formation in the intemal labour market may take the following implicit type : it 
diverts the senior worker's work time from production to teaching. This makes 
this model differ from the human capital theory, where the cost is set to be incurred 
explicidy by the firm at the beginning of the training (Oi (1962), Becker (1964), 
Hashimoto (1981), Ohashi (1983)). 
Following Azariadis (1976) the firm's production function, which has 
junior workers and senior workers as the arguments, is specified as follows : 
Q = f(n, m ) (1) 
where n denotes the number of junior workers, and m denotes the number of 
senior workers measured in efficient units which will be defined below. Let each 
of the skilled workers have a given amount of work hours H available for 
production and teaching. Assume that it takes a skilled worker h hours out of H 
to transmit skills to a junior worker in a period. The efficient units of senior 
workers available for production is 
m = m ( l - n h / m H ) 
= m - n s = n (z - s) 
where s = h/H is the fraction of a senior worker's work time devoted to 
teaching junior workers; and z = m/n is the ratio of trainers to trainees. It is 
assumed that 5 is fixed, while z is a choice variable in the model (n and z 
together determine the employment of the workers). 
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Assuming the senior worker can take both skilled and unskilled tasks, while 
the junior worker can only take unskilled tasks, the production function (1) has 
the following properties (Azariadis (1976), p . l 2 0 ) : 
(1) It is strictly concave in n and m; 
(2) (i) f( n, 0 ) = 0 for all n > 0, 
(ii) f( 0, r^ ) > 0 for all m > 0 
and 
(3) di/dm > di/dn. 
Property (1) is the typical property of production function. Property (2) (i) states 
that without senior workers production would be impossible. Property (2) (ii) 
says that, since senior workers can perform all the tasks, positive production exists 
even without junior workers. Property (3) indicates that a junior worker's 
marginal product can never be greater than that of a senior workers. 
In what follows it is assumed that m > 0 holds from technological 
considerations. 
2.2 The Implications of General Skills and Mobility Costs 
Consider first the polar case that the skills acquired by the worker in the firm 
are general ones, so that the firm faces a competitive market for the skilled workers. 
Let Wm denote the market wage for these workers. In recruiting the common 
workers it is also assumed that the firm faces the competitive market where the 
wage, Wn, is given (for example, it may be determined by years of schooling). 
A worker is assumed to have two periods of working life. At the beginning 
of the first period he can join the firm as a junior worker. Training takes place 
during the period and is completed at the end of that period. At the beginning of the 
second period he becomes a skilled worker. This does not imply that he always 
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stays at the original firm. Rather it depends on the firm's policy on the 
determination of the vacancies of junior and senior positions. 
The firm wants to maximize its steady-state profit (the product price is 
normalized to one): 
7C = f( n, m ) - C 
where m = n (z - s) as defined before, and C is the wage cost defined as : 
C = n Wn + m wjn = n (wn + z w ^ ) if z (= m / n ) < 1 (2) 
To highlight the effects of mobility costs on employment it is assumed that the firm 
can hire skilled workers from outside. Let the wage paid to the outside recruits be 
"^s '^m)- The difference between Wg and Wjji may reflect the premium 
received by the outside recruit for his mobility (the subsidy for commuting, the 
cost of resettling his family, etc). Thus 
C = n w^ + n Wjjj + (m - n) Wg if z > 1 (2') 
The two cost equations can be combined as 
C = n (wn + z Wjn) + y n (ws - Wm) ( z - 1) (2") 
with y = 0 if z < 1, and y = 1 if z > 1. 
In maximizing its profits the wage rates w^, w^^, and Wg are 
exogenously given to the firm. This assumption is reasonable given that skills are 
not firm-specific. Thus the firm can only choose the number of its workers in this 
problem. The first-order maximization conditions are : 
n: fn + (z - s) f ^ - (wn + z w ^ ) - y (wg - w ^ ) (z - 1) = 0 
z: n frji - n Wm - y n (wg - w ^ ) = 0 
where fn and fm denote the marginal products of the common and skilled worker, 
respectively. 
Now suppose at any moment of time the market consists of two types of 
firms : one is the group in which the firm maintains its number of skilled worker at 
a level less than or equal to the junior workers (z < 1), the other is the group in 
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which firms set z > 1. If the firm under investigation belongs to the first group, 
the above equations reduce to (since y = 0): 
wm = fm ; (3) 
and 
Wn = fn - sffn- (4) 
This is the familiar efficiency condition that in competitive labour markets the 
trained worker's wage equals his marginal value product and tiie common worker's 
wage equals his marginal value product net of the training cost. At the beginning of 
the first period the firm will employ junior workers according to condition (4). 
Some of them (since m < n) may be laid off by the firm after the training . 
Terminating the employment relationship does not hurt any party here, because the 
firm does not bear the burden of the training cost while the laid-off worker can get a 
job from the market with the same pay, since the skills he owns are general. 
A firm may find it profitable to recruit additional skilled workers fi-om the 
market (depending on the production function). In this case the optimal conditions 
become (since y = 1): 
ws = f ^ ; (5) 
and 
fn + (z - s) frfi = Wn + z Win + (Wg - w^) (z - 1) (6) 
Rearranging the second equation yields 
fn - s fm = wn + ws (z - 1) + wm - z f ^ . 
Using (5), this simplifies to : 
Wn = (fn - sfi5i) + (wg - Wm). (6') 
Equation (5) determines the employment of skilled workers. The condition 
implies w ^ < f ^ (because Wg > w ^ under assumption). That is, if a firm 
hires some skilled workers from outside, it will employ, for the same number of 
junior workers n, a smaller number of senior workers than that implied by (3), 
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the usual marginal efficiency condition. Inequation (6'), since the second term on 
the right-hand-side is positive, it indicates 
^ n > fn - s f ^ , 
i. e. the firm will employ more junior workers than the level indicated by (4), the 
usual efficiency condition. Notice that one should not infer from equation (5) and 
(6') that there is "inefficiency" in the employment of the workers in this situation. 
It is the cost of recruitment - a kind of transaction cost ~ that drives the firm 
away from employing workers at the usual efficiency conditions. To hire a skilled 
worker from the market, the transaction cost forces the firm to pay the worker more 
than that paid to the internally trained workers. Hence the firm has an incentive to 
decrease the number of the skilled workers. It is of interest to notice that the 
employment of the junior workers is also affected under this situation. Because 
investment in junior workers is a source of skilled workers to the firm in the future, 
increasing their employment is profitable. 
The results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. Whenever there are recruiting costs, the firm which hires skilled 
workers from outside will deviate its employment from the usual efficiency 
condition that wages equal marginal value products. This holds even when the 
skills acquired through on-the-job d-aining are general (i. e. the labour market is 
competitive). 
23 Firm-Specific Skills and Promotions 
In the real world the firm hardly treats the incumbent workers and outside 
recruits as perfect substitutes in production. This is because a firm's productivity is 
not only concerned with its physical capital but also with its organizational capital 
(Prescott and Visscher (1980)). The latter includes the information of matching 
workers to workers, the knowledge about the development and maintenance of 
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some redesigned machines (which are initially standard equipment), etc. 
Therefore a firm with a high turnover rate of incumbent workers loses some of its 
organizational capital. The firm may decide to form its internal labour market and 
confines its on-the-job training to firm-specific skills.3 The assumption that the 
skills acquired by the worker fiDm the firm are firm-specific is, of course, a polar 
case too (in contrast to the former case in which the skills are general). But it 
simplifies the analysis and allows us to investigate the forces driving wages away 
from the value of marginal products. In forming its internal labour market the firm 
has the advantage of being able to maintain stable supplies of labour services and 
being in a monopsonistic position in relation to its senior workers. 
Since the prospect of promotion is important to a worker who joins the 
internal labour market, it is discussed first Assume all the junior workers of a 
given cohort enter the firm at the same time. At the beginning of the second period 
all senior workers retire, so there are m vacancies available for promotion. If the 
firm sets m > n , tiien tiie probability of promotion, p , equals one. This is the 
case where the firm wants to recruit skilled workers fi-om outside, wth nontrivial 
costs to fill some senior positions. On the other hand, the firm may set m < n 
and no outside recruitment is required. In this case all senior positions are filled 
internally, and it is reasonable to assume that a worker's probability of promotion is 
the ratio m / n. Combining these two cases the rate of promotion is defined as 
p = min ( m / n, 1 ) 
We may set p as a function of the labour ratio : 
p = p (z) where z = m / n (7) 
which has the property that 
3 Doeringe and Piore (1971) have a detailed illustration of this aspect. 
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p (z) = z if z < 1 
p (z) = 1 and p'(z) = 0 if z > 1 
= 1 and p'(z) is not defined if z = 1 (it will be seen later that 
» 
this does not affect our results). The function is illustrated in Figure 1. 
If a worker is not promoted after his training he may either continue staying 
at the firm and receive w^ there, or leave die firm and receive WQ from outside 
opportunities. The decision depends on which is better. Thus the worker's 
participation constraint is"^  (the assumption that the working life consists of two 
periods and that the rate of time preference is zero is maintained): 
U(wn) + p U(wm) + (1 - p) max [ U(Wn), U(wo) ] > 2 U(wo). (8) 
In order to retain its (promoted) senior workers, the firm must offer w^i so that 
the utility derivable is not less than that from the outside opportunity : 
U(wni) > U(wo) (9) 
Before proceeding it is argue that, since there is no reason for the firm to 
offer a contract which gives the worker utilities higher than the reservation level 
2 U ( W Q ) , constraint (8) can be set as an equality. With constraint (9) this implies 
U(wn) < U(wo). 
Thus in equation (8) 
max [ U(wn), U(wo) ] = U(wo) 
i. e. the first period wage is never strictly greater than the outside opportunity. 
Now consider the firm's wage cost. Clearly, if the the firm does not hire 
skilled workers from outside, equation (2) is still applicable. But if it does then, 
since the skills are firm-specific, to fill senior positions with outside recruits 
properly, the firm must incur some adjustment costs. The size of this cost is 
determined by the number of the outside recruits, m - n. Let v denote the cost 
4 Equation (8) and (9) below are similar to Oswald (1984), however, the 
specification of the rate of promotion is different. 
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z = m/n 
Figure 1 
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(in output terms), and formalize it as 
V = a ( m - n)'^ 
if m - n > 0, and v = 0 i f m - n < 0 ; where 6 > 0 representing the 
scale effect of outside recruits on the adjustment cost Then 
V = a [n ( m / n - 1)]B = a nB (z - 1)S. 
Equation (2') is now changed into 
C = n Wn + n w^^ + (m - n) Wg + v if z > 1. 
Combining (2) and the above equation together forms 
C = n Wn + m Wm + y [ (wg - Wjn) (m - n) + v ] 
where y = 0 if z < 1, and y = 1 if z > 1. 
The firm has monopsonistic power (because the skills are firm-specific), so 
the problem is to choose the employment n, m and wages w^, Wj^ to maximize 
its steady-state profit 
K = f(n, m) - C 
subject to the ex ante constraint of participation : 
U(wn) + p U(wm) + d - p) U(wo) = 2 U(wo) (10) 
and the ex post constraint (9) of keeping its senior workers. 
To simplify the analysis, notice that the participation constraint (10) implies 
that: 
U(wo) - U(wn) = p[U(wm) - U(wo) ]. (H) 
This equation is reasonable : the left-hand-side is the the worker's loss of utility in 
the first period, if WQ > w^ (it will be seen later that this is just the case), while 
the right-hand-side is his expected gain in the second period. In equilibrium they 
must be balanced. Together with equation (9) it impHes that only the following 
5 The problem differs from that discussed in Chapter m in that productivity 
depends on the acquired skiUs of the worker here, rather than a worker's 
ability. The skiUs accumulated are assumed to be firm-specific and have no 
value for other firms. 
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two types of wage profile are possible : 
Case (a) : U(wni) > Uiw^) > U(wn); 
and 
I 
Case (b): = U(wo) = U(wn). 
We relegate the firm's optimality condition to Appendix VA and state the 
results found here. 
Proposition 2. If the formation of firm-specific skills is through the way of "the 
seniors teach the juniors" and the fum offers a steep wage profile to its workers 
(Case (a)), then at optimum 
(1) The optimal rate of promotion, p*, is always less than one, i. e. the 
junior worker has the risk of being not promoted after the training; and 
(2) The senior worker's wage is greater than his marginal value product, 
and the junior worker's wage is less than his marginal value product 
More specifically, for p* < 1 (and z* < 1), it can be shown that the 
optimal employment conditions are (see (A6)) 
wm = fm + [U(wm) - U(wo)]/U'(wn); (12) 
and (see (A7)) 
wn = (fn - sffii) - z (wm - f^)- (13) 
The intuition behind these two equations is easy to grasp. The first equation says 
that the senior worker's wage, Wj^ , exceeds his marginal value product, f^. 
This is because the marginal contribution of an additional senior position is two-fold 
: adding revenues (outputs) to the firm directly; and raising the junior worker's 
probability of promotion which allows the fum to decrease the "risk-adjusted 
compensation" required by them (for taking the risk of being not promoted). The 
latter effect equals the change in the rate of promotion, dp/dm, times the total risk-
adjustment compensation paid to the junior workers, n [ U(Wjn) - U(Wo) ]AJ'(wn). 
Thus it is (since dp/dm = dz/dm = 1 / n) 
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(dp/dm) n [ U(wjn) - UCwq) ] / U'Cw^) 
= [U(wm) - U(wo) ] /U ' (wn) 
which can further be expressed as^ 
= { [ U(wn,) - U(wo) ] / U'(wn,) } [ U'(wn,) / U'(wn) ] 
= [ (wm - WQ) + (wm - W o ) 2 A / 2 ] / ( M R S n m ) 
where A is the measure of the worker's absolute risk-aversion, and 
MRSnm = " (dwj^/dwn) u= constant 
is the worker's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between present wage 
income and future wage income in the event that he is promoted. Thus high risk-
aversion or low MRS implies a high risk-adjusted compensation requirement, 
which is consistent with intuition. Notice that if U is linear, then A = 0 and 
MRS = 1, the above expression becomes simply Wjjj - Wq. 
Now using (12) inequation (13) yields 
wn = (fn - s f A ) - z [U(wm) - U(wo) ] /U ' (wn) . (13') 
This says that the junior worker's wage is less than his net value of marginal 
product, (fn - s fj^^). The second term on the right-hand-side is the decrease in 
profits due to an additional junior position : though the additional position increases 
the firm's output, it also has an adverse effect in reducing the probability of 
promotion by dp/dn. Thus the firm is forced to raise the risk-adjusted 
compensation. The decrease in profits due to an additional junior position can be 
measured as (since dp/dn = dz/dn = - z / n) 
(dp/dn) n [U(wm) - U(wo) ] / U'(wn) 
= - z [ U ( w m ) - U ( w o ) ] / U ' ( w n ) . 
At an optimum this amount will be deducted from the junior worker's net 
marginal value product in deciding his pay, which is just what equation (13') 
6 The proof is similar to Footnote 9, Chapter II (with some changes in 
notation). 
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indicates. 
Corollary. Under Case (a) at an optimum the w^i - w^ differential is greater than 
the Wo-Wn differential. This holds as long as the worker is risk averse or risk 
neutral.^ 
Proof From equation (11) we know (since at optimum p* < 1) 
[U(wm) - U(wo) ] / [ U(Wo) - U(wn)] = (1 /p*) > 1. 
The term on the left-hand-side indicates that w ^ - WQ is greater tiian WQ - w^ 
as long as the utility function is concave (not necessarily strictly). 
Proposition 3. If the firm offers flat wage profile to its workers (Case (b)), then : 
(1) The rate of promotion is always equal to one, and skilled workers from 
outside may be recruited; 
(2) If it does hire skilled workers from outside, then at an optimum (i) the 
employment of the skilled workers will be set at tiie point where 
Ws = fm - 6 v / ( m - n ) , 
(ii) the total employment is set such that 
Wo = ( fn - s f f t + f fh ) / 2; and 
(3) Net marginal value products of the two types of workers satisfy the 
inequality: 
fn - s f m < Wo < fm-
Proposition 3 is intuitively reasonable. The optimal wage profile is flat only if the 
probability of promotion is unity. For if p* < 1, then there would be gains in 
trading off w^ against increases in promotion prospects and thus wages would 
have to satisfy conditions (12) and (13) above. Since all junior workers are 
"7 Oswald obtains a similar conclusion under the condition that the worker is 
strictly risk-averse. Because he can not rule out the possibility of p* = 1, 
a strictiy concave utility function is required to get this result. This model 
shows that the conclusion holds even when the worker is risk-neutral. 
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promoted, the firm may want to have more skilled workers than that internally 
promoted (whether m* > n* or m* = n* depends on technological 
considerations). Condition (2) (i) simply says that if some skilled workers are 
recruited from outside, then the number of the senior workers must be at the point 
where their marginal value products just equals its total using cost (the wage cost) 
Wg, plus per capita adjustment cost, 6 v / (m - n). Condition (2) (ii) indicates 
that 
2 Wo = ( fn - s ) + fi^i. 
The life-time wage cost of a worker (2wo) must be equal to his life-time net 
marginal value product (this consists of his first period marginal product, f^ 
- s fi5i, and his second-period marginal product, ffjj). Condition (3) simply says 
tiiat there is cross subsidization between senior workers and junior workers. This 
is always the case because the former group has higher productivity than the latter 
group, while tiiey receive the same wage income here. 
Propositions 2 and 3 characterize the properties of local maxima. Whether a 
global maximum is of type (a) (a steep wage profile) or type (b) (a flat wage 
profile) depends on the precise functional forms of f(n, m) and on parameters 
such as s and 6. 
In formulating the objective function of the firm, it has been implicitly 
assumed that workers who are not promoted will be laid off by the firm. In a more 
general formulation this need not be the case. In fact it can offer WQ, the wage the 
workers can earn from alternative opportunities, to retain a fraction (b < 1) of 
them. Whether this policy is optimal depends on the comparison of costs with 
benefits : in doing this the firm can place those b (n - m) trained workers in the 
junior positions and decrease the number of newly recruited junior workers. This 
allows it to save some training cost. But the number of potential senior workers to 
be promoted will be smaller, because these who stay with the firm despite the lack 
of promotion wiU have to retire in the next period (their working life being a two-
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period time span). On the other hand, the wage cost will increase by b (n - m) 
WQ The balance of these conflicting forces would determine the optimal retention 
policy. The issues become more complex if the jobs are not homogeneous, for 
then the trained workers may have higher productivity than the novices. Also, 
with this policy, the junior workers recnnted in the next period have a better chance 
of promotion (there are n - b (n -m) junior workers and m senior positions). 
This may affect the fmn's decision about the wage structure. It seems impossible 
to take all these into account in the simple two-period life-time formulation used so 
far. Thus we turn to a model in which workers possess a longer time horizon. 
3. Life-time Career, Promotion, and Wage Profiles 
Consider an enterprise's internal labour market that includes three levels of 
workers : the juniors, the skilled and the foremen. It is assumed that the firm 
guarantees life-time employment to a worker once he is hired. An employee's 
working life includes T-t- 2 periods : At the beginning of the first period he enters 
the firm serving as a junior worker, and accepts on-the-job training (taught by the 
skilled workers) during that period. At the beginning of the second period he 
becomes a skilled worker. It is assumed that the firm selects junior workers 
carefully so that every one hired is qualified to finish the training. The firm then 
evaluates the worker's merit on other aspects such as his initiative, coordination 
with his co-workers, etc during that period. For the rest of his working life (T 
periods) he has the chance to be promoted as a foreman. Once promoted he stays 
at that status, otherwise he remains serving as a skilled worker until he retires. 
The firm's production technology is described by : 
Q = f ( N i , N2' N3) 
where N j denotes the number of junior workers, N3 denotes the number of 
foremen, N2 denotes the number of skilled workers measured in efficient units : 
N2 = N2 - Ni s 
126 
where s, as has been defined before, is the fraction of a skilled worker's work 
time devoted in teaching a junior worker. Notice that the foremen do not spend 
time in teaching skills, they are assumed to perform the activities of coordination, 
monitoring, and production. To facilitate the analysis assume further, that the 
foreman's marginal productivity is no less than that of the skilled worker, which in 
tum is greater than that of the junior worker. 
Let wj, i = 1, 2, 3 denote the wage paid to the junior worker, skilled 
worker and the foreman, respectively. The firm's profit at any moment of time is 
then (again the product price is normalized to one): 
K = f(Ni, N2, N3) - N j wi - N2 W2 - N3 W3 (14) 
To join the firm a young worker's life-time expected utility must be no less 
than the reservation level, Uo (we maintain the assumption that the rate of time 
preference is zero): 
U(wi) + U(W2) + E(U) > Uo (15) 
where E(U) is his expected utility from the third stage in which promotion may 
take place. The origin of time is chosen so that the third stage begins at time zero. 
Suppose promotion takes place at time t, 0 < t < T. Before promotion 
the worker receives W2, so the utility derivable is tU(w2). After the promotion 
he receives W3 until his retirement, the utility is (T-t)U(w3). Let g(t) be the 
probability of promotion at time t. The worker's expected utility in the third stage 
is 
E(U) = lT=o [ t U(W2) + (T - t ) U(W3)] g(t) 
= T U(W3) - [ U(W3) - U(w2) ] ZT=0 t g(0 
= TU(W3) - [ U(w3) - U(W2) ] Et (16) 
where E^ is the expected waiting time before his promotion. It is assumed that 
W3 > W2, otherwise promotion does not mean anything to the worker. The above 
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equation is reasonable : if promotion takes place immediately after the training, the 
worker can enjoy an utility level TU(w3) during the third stage. However, 
because of the waiting, there is a utility loss. An amount, [U(w3) - U(w2)] E ,^ 
must be deducted in the calculation of his expected utility in the third stage. 
Substituting equation (16) in (15), the participation constraint becomes 
U(wi) + ( Et + 1) U(W2) + ( T - Et) U(W3) > Uo (15') 
Apparently the timing of promotion is crucial for the worker. Some may be 
promoted early while others may be promoted much later. So we discuss briefly 
the factors affecting a typical worker's considerations in the estimate of his waiting 
time of promotion at the stage of signing the contract. In a study Koike (1984) 
found that for blue-collar intemal labour markets when several qualified candidates 
compete for a position of higher ranks, it is usually the employee who has stayed 
the longest in his preceding job who gets promotion (unless he is known to lack 
ability or is not fit for the job). This amounts to deciding promotion by seniority. 
If this is the case, a worker's expected waiting time is affected by several factors : 
the competitiveness of his colleagues who enter the firm at the same time as him; 
the number of workers who joined the firm before him and are waiting for 
promotion; and the number of vacancies (this equals the foremen's rate of 
retirement times the number of established position, N3). Of these considerations, 
the last two -- the number of vacancies and the number of aspirants -- seem to be 
the only information available to the young worker's assessment (and the firm is 
willing to provide it to him). Therefore the worker's expected waiting time is 
modeled as^ 
8 The interaction between r and N2 is ignored. In fact, it seems reasonable 
to assume that N2 = N2(r) with aN2/ar < 0, i.e. increasing the 
foremen's retirement rate will decrease the number of the competitors faced 
by the worker. 
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Et = E ( r , N2, N3) 
where r is the foremen's (constant) rate of retirement; 3E/aN3 < 0 (the greater 
the number of the higher rank positions, the shorter is the waiting time), and 
9E/aN2 > 0. 
The firm's problem is to maximize (14) subject to the constraint (15').9 
The Lagrangean function is 
A 
£ = f (Ni ,N2, N3) - w j N j - W2N2 - W3 N3 
+ { U(wi) + [ Et + 1 ] U(W2) + [ T - Et ] U(W3) - Uq }. 
The first-order conditions are (assuming all Nj and wj, i = 1,2, 3 are 
strictly positive): 
Ni : f i - s f 2 - wi = 0 (17) 
N2: f2 - W2 - | i [U(w3) - U(w2)]9E/aN2 = 0 (18) 
N3: f3 - W3 - H[U(W3) - U(W2)] aE/aN3 = 0 (19) 
wi : - Ni + U'(wi) = 0 (20) 
W2: - N2 + |i [ Et + 1 ] U'(W2) = 0 (21) 
W3: - N3 + | I [ T - E t ] U'(w3) = 0 (22) 
where fi = 3f/3Ni is the marginal product of the worker with level/. 
Equation (17) indicates 
wi = f i - s f 2 (23) 
which says that during the training period the worker's wage is less than his 
marginal product, f i (though it equals his net marginal product, f i - s f2). 
Rewriting (20) yields 
^ = N i / U ' ( w i ) > 0. 
Therefore equation (18) and (19) indicate, respectively 
9 For simplicity it is assumed that the firm wishes to maximize its steady-state 
profit. 
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W2 = f2 - [ U(W3) - U(w2) ] aE/aN2 < £2 (24) 
W3 = f3 - L^ [ U(w3) - U(W2) ] aE/aN3 > f3 (25) 
Equation (24) says that, after the training, the worker's wage is still smaller than 
his marginal product, f2, until the time promotion takes place; and equation (25) 
indicates that the worker's wage exceeds his marginal product once he is promoted. 
Now turn to analyse the firm's employment decision. Equation (20) and 
(21) together imply 
N 2 / N 1 = [Et + 1] U'(w2)/U'(wi) . (26) 
Since no junior workers quit and after one period every junior worker becomes a 
skilled worker waiting for promotion, it is clear that N2 ^ N^. Also, equation 
(21) and (22) together imply: 
N 3 / N 2 = [ ( T - E t ) U ' (W3)] / [ ( E t + 1 ) U ' (W2)] ( 2 7 ) 
This result indicates that N3 may be greater or less than N2. Since the foremen 
are selected from the skilled workers in the model, it is of interest to consider the 
condition under which N3 < N2 holds. A sufficient condition is (since 
U'(w3) < U ' ( W 2 ) ) : 
T - Et < Et + 1 
or 
Et > (T - l ) / 2 
> T / 2 . 
The condition is intuitive : with a life-time employment commitment, if the 
worker's average waiting time for promotion is greater than T / 2 , one half of his 
time during which he is qualified to promotion, then the firm can maintain its 
number of high-rank-employees at a level less than that of the low-rank-employees. 
The results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. If a firm provides training and prospects of promotion to its 
workers, then at an optimum : 
(1) The individual worker's life-time wage profile is steeper than that 
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indicated by his marginal producq and 
(2) A sufficient condition for its foremen to be less in number than its skilled 
workers (the pvxamid structure of organization) is that an individual worker's 
waiting time for promotion is greater than one half of the time during which he is 
qualified for promotion. 
Examples : 
1. Promotion is sure to take place at a certain poira in time. 
Suppose the firm guarantees that every skilled worker gets promotion after some 
years of ser%dce. Then the worker's expected waiting time, E ,^ is a constant; and 
he need not worrv about the vacancies so 
a E t / a X i = 0 for i = 2,3. 
Under these circumstances the conditions for the optimal wage profile are 
wi = f i - Sf2; 
W2 = f2; 
and 
W3 = f3 
while the ratios of the workers are still determined by condition (26) and (27). 
This example illustrates that when promotion is guaranteed, the worker's 
wage will be set equal to his marginal product This result is similar to that outlined 
in Proposition 3 of Section 2. When tiiere are no outside recruits, mobility costs 
and adjustment costs can be ignored (i. e. Wg = w ^ and v = 0), then senior 
workers and junior workers would be employed at the point where w^^ = fgi' 
and wn = fn - ^^m^ respectively (see equation (AlO) and (All)) . However, 
the timing of promotion has some effects on the organization of the firm which are 
ignored in the two-period model. 
2. The density function of promotion is an exponential distribution. 
An exponential distribution measures the duration of time between an initial point of 
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time and the occurrence of the event of interest. Thus it is chosen to illustrate the 
situation under which promotion may take place at any point of time in the third 
stage. Let the exponential density function be 
g( t ; 6) = ( 1 / 0 ) e-t/0, t > 0, 0 > 0 
where 0 is the parameter of the distribution. Then expected years of waiting 
before promotion is approximately 0 (because the mean value of an exponential 
distribution is G).^^ SQ ggt 
Et = 0 ( r , N2, N3) . 
Using it in equations (23) - (27) the optimal conditions are 
w j = f^ - s f2 
W2 = f2 - { [U(w3) - U ( w 2 ) ] / U ' ( w i ) ) Ni (a0/aN2) 
W3 = f3 - { [U(w3) - U ( w 2 ) ] / U ' ( w i ) ) Ni (a0/aN3) 
N 2 / N 1 = ( 1 + 0 ) U ' ( w 2 ) / U ' ( w i ) 
N 3 / N 2 = ( T - 0 ) U ' ( w 3 ) / ( l + 0 ) U'(w2). 
4. Concluding Remark 
Various conditions under which an internal labour market may not equate 
wages with marginal products have been illustrated. Factors considered in the 
analysis include the type of the training (general or specific), mobility costs, 
adjustment costs and the uncertainty of promotion. When the timing of the 
promotion is also taken into account, it provides a partial explanation of the ratios 
10 This value is overestimated, because the worker's working life is finite in 
our model. The true value should be 
Et = l o (t/0) e - t / 9 d t = 0 - (T + 0) e 'T/e 
For simplicity it is assumed that T is large enough so that the second term on 
the right-hand-side is ignored. 
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of employment in different ranks. 
In the above analysis workers' ability to quit is ignored. A worker may ex 
a^zre decide to quit in the near future (Nickell (1976)) or he may decide to quit 
during the waiting time for promotion (Cooter and Restrepo (1979)). In 
Appendix VB it is shown that, when the junior workers' quit rate is added in the 
two-period model and treated as an exogenous variable, essential conclusions from 
Propositions 2 and 3 still hold, except the explanation becomes more fruitful: the 
firm will adopt the upward sloping wage profile if the quit rate is lower than a 
certain level, otherwise the flat wage profile is more likely to occur. 
11 The timing of promotion is also an important consideration in Beckmann 
(1978). However, he concentrates on discussing the relationship between 
the probability of promotion and wage profiles. The worker's productivity 
in different jobs is ignored to facilitate the analysis. 
133 
Appendix VA 
Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 
The Lagrangean function of the problem is 
£ = f(n, rh) - n (wn + z v/^) - y [ n (wg - Wj^ ) (z - 1) + v ] 
+ [ U(wn) + p U(wni) - (1 - p) U(Wo) ] + x [ U(Wjn) - UCWQ)] 
where v = a n^ (z -1)'^. 
The first-order conditions are : 
n : fn + (z - s) - (wn + z Wj^ ) 
- y [ (ws - wm) (z - 1) + av/an ] = 0 (Al) 
z : n fi$j - n Win - y [ n (ws - Wm) + dy/dz ] 
+ ^ip' [U(Wm)-U(Wo)] = 0 (A2) 
Wn : - n + ^ U'(wn) = 0 (A3) 
Wm : - n z + y n (z - 1) + |i p UXw^) + x U'(wm) = 0. (A4) 
Case(a) : U(wm) > U(wo) > U(wn). 
The first inequality implies that constraint (9) is not binding, thus the 
multiplier attached to it is zero, i.e.x = 0. 
(i) If z < 1, then y = 0, p < 1 and p' = 1. 
Equation (A3) implies 
= n /U ' (wn) (A5) 
and from (A2) 
wm = fm + ( ^ i / n ) [ U ( w m ) - U ( w o ) ] . 
Using (A5) in it yields 
wm = fm + [U(wm) - U(wo) ] / U'(wn) (A6) 
which indicates that w ^ > fm since the second term on the right-hand-side is 
strictly positive. 
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Now equation (Al) implies 
Wn = fn - s ffii - z (Win - ^m)- (A7) 
Since the last term on the right-hand-side is strictly positive as has been proved, 
this indicates that w^ is less than its net marginal value product, f^ - sfi^j. 
(ii) If z > 1 or z = 1, then p = 1. 
By constraint (11), w^j = Wj^  must hold for p = 1, which contradicts 
the assumption that w^j > w^. 
This completes the proof of proposition 2 that for the steep wage profile, at 
an optimum, 
wm > fm. wn < fn and p* < 1. 
Case (b) : U(Wm) = U(Wo) = U(wn) 
The first equality indicates that the multiplier attached to constraint (9) must 
be nonnegative, i. e. x > 0. 
(i) If z < 1, then y = 0. 
Under these circumstances equation (A2) is reduced to 
wm = fm 
while equation (Al) becomes 
wn + z fm = fn + (z - s) 
Substituting in (A8) yields 
wn = f n - s f f e (A9) 
Combining (A8) and (A9) produces (since fm > fn) 
Wm > Wn-
This result contradicts our assumption that Wm = (= WQ). 
(ii) If z > 1, then y = 1 and p = 1. 
Using the fact that dv/dz = 6 a n S ( z -1)^-1 = 6 v / ( z - l ) inequation (A2) 
yields 
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n f m - n wjn - [ n (Wg - w ^ ) + 6 v / (z - 1) ] = 0 . 
Solving for Wg yields 
ws = fm - fiv/n (z - 1) 
= fm - fiv/(m - n) (AlO) 
which indicates that Wg < fi;^ (since z > 1, m > n here). 
Now rewrite equation (Al) as (after substimting dv/dn = B a n S - l 
(z - = S v / n ) 
fn + z f m - s f m - (wn + z Wm) - (Wg - w ^ ) (z - 1) - B v / n = 0 (A l l ) 
Substituting (AlO) in and using the fact that Wjji = Wj^  = Wg yields 
f n - s f i 5 i + z f ^ - 2 w o - [ f m - 6 v / ( m - n ) ] ( z - l ) - B v / n = 0 
which implies 
2 WQ = fn - s frii + f ^ + 6 V [ (z - 1) / (m - n) - 1 / n ]. 
The last term on the right-hand-side is zero, hence 
Wo = ( f n - + f f h ) / 2 (A12) 
which determines the employment level under the flat wage profile. Meanwhile, 
since f m > fn " ^ ^iri' above equation implies 
fn - s f m < Wo < f,$i. (A13) 
This completes the proof of proposition 3. 
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Appendix VB 
The purpose of this appendix is to show diat, when the quit rate of the 
junior workers is introduced into the two-period model and treated as an exogenous 
variable, the conclusions of Propositions 2 and 3 still hold. 
Suppose the quit rate of the junior workers in the first-period of their 
working life, represented by ^ , is exogenously determined. Let r (= 1 - q) 
denote the rate of the junior workers remaining at the end of the first period, and 
m , n , be the numbers of senior and junior workers/positions in the firm, 
respectively. If m < r n , then the junior workers face competition for 
promotions, otherwise all those junior workers staying at the firm are promoted as 
the senior workers (and the firm may recruit some skilled workers from outside). 
So the rate of promotion is 
p = min ( m / r n , 1) 
= min ( z / r , 1) 
where z = m / n. The promotion function can be set as 
p ( z / r ) = z / r if z / r < l 
= 1 a n d dp/dz = 0 i f z / r > 1 
= 1 and dp/dz is not defined if z / r = 1. 
The worker's participation constraint is the same as equation (10): 
U(wn) + p U(wm) + ( 1 - P ) U(wo) = 2U(wo) (A14) 
The firm's cost function becomes 
C = n w n + mwjn if r n > m (i. e. no outside recruits). 
= n w n + r n w m + ( n i - r n ) w s + a ( m - r n ) s if r n < m . 
where w^, Wm and Wg are the wages paid to the junior worker, senior worker 
and the outside skilled worker recruited, respectively. Combining the above two 
expressions produces : 
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C = n Wn + m Wjn + y [ ( m - r n ) ( Wj - Wj^ ) + ( m - r n ] (A15) 
where y = 0 if r > z, and y = 1 if r < z. 
The production function is 
Q = f (n , A ) 
where m = n ( r - s ) > 0, and s is the fraction of a senior worker's time 
devoted to teaching junior workers. 
The problem is to maximize the firm's profit with respect to w^, w j^^ , n 
and z , subject to constraint (A14), and the constraint that the senior worker's 
second period utility is not less than his outside opportunity : 
U(wm) > U(wo). (A16) 
Let |J. and x be the multipliers on the two constraints, respectively. The 
Lagrangean function is 
£ = f( n, m ) - n ( Wn + z Wm ) - y [ n ( Wg - Wm ) ( z - r ) + v ] 
+ [i [ U(wn) + p U(wm) - ( 1 - p ) U(wo) ] + x [ U(wni) - U(wo)] 
where v = a ( m - r n = a n*^  ( z - r 
The first-order conditions are : 
n : fn + ( z - s ) f ^ - ( wn + z wm ) 
- y [ (ws - wm) ( z - r ) + dv/dn ] = 0 ( A 1 7 ) 
z : n fjii - n Wm - y [ n ( Ws - Wm) + dv/dz ] 
+ ( dp/dz ) [ U ( w m ) - U ( w o ) ] = 0 ( A 1 8 ) 
Wn : - n + U'(wn) = 0 (A19) 
Wm : - n z + y n ( z - r ) + ! ipU ' (wm) + x U'Cw^) = 0 (A20) 
Case ( a ) : U(wm) > U(wo) > U(wn) 
This is the case of upward sloping wage profile. The fu-st inequaUty implies that 
constraint (A16) is not binding, thus the associated multipUer, x , equals zero. 
The following two situations are analysed. 
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(i) if r > z, then y = 0, p < 1 and ap/3z = 1 / r. 
Equation (A 19) implies 
n / U ' ( w n ) (A21) 
Since d-p/dz = 1 / r , (A 18) can be rewrited as : 
Wm = fm + ( ^ i / n r ) [ U ( w m ) - U ( w o ) ] . 
Using (A21) yields 
wm = + [ U(wrn) - U(Wo) ] / r U'(wn) 
which indicates that Wj^ > fj^. 
Now equation (A 17) inriplies 
Wn = fn - s fi5i - z ( w ^ - fj^i) 
Since the last term in the right-hand-side is strictly positive, the result shows that 
thejunior worker's wage is less than his net marginal value product, f^ - s fj^-
(ii) If r < z, or r = z, then p = 1. 
By constraint (11), if p = 1, the equality Wjn = w^ must hold. This 
contradicts the assumption that Wj^ > w^. 
Thus the same conclusions as Proposition 2, tiiat for tiie steep wage profile, 
at an optimum, 
w m > fm. Wn < fn and p* < 1. 
The result predicts that tiie firm would adopt tiie steep wage profile if the junior 
workers' quitting rate, q (= I - r), is lower than a cenain level (1 - z). 
Case (b) : UCw^) = U(wo) = U(wn) 
The first equality indicates that the multiplier attached to constraint (A 16) is 
non-negative, i. e. ;i: > 0. 
(i) If r > z, then y = 0. 
Under these circumstances equation (A 18) reduces to 
w - f - (A23) 
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while equation (A 17) becomes (using (A22)) 
^n = fn - sffh (A24) 
Combining (A23) and (A24) yields (since f ^ > fn) 
Wjn > Wn 
which contradicts the assumption that Wj^ = w^ here, 
(ii) If r < z, then y = 1 and p = 1. 
Using the fact that dv/dz = B a n S ( z - r ) f i = 6 v / ( z - r ) in equation 
(A18) yields 
n fm - n Wm - [ n ( w^ - w ^ ) + 6 v / ( z - r ) ] = 0 
This solves to 
Ws = fi$i - 6 V / ( z - r) n (A25) 
from which it can be seen that Wg < fj^. 
Equation (A17) (after substituting 3v/3n = 6 a nfi-l(z-r) '^ = 6v/n 
in it) yields 
fn + ( z - s ) fi^ i - ( Wn + z wm ) - ( Wg - w ^ ) ( z - r) - S v / n = 0 
Using (A25) in the above equation produces 
fn + ( z - s ) ffJi - Wn - r Wm 
- [ f i ^ - 6 v / ( z - r ) n ] ( z - r ) - 6 v / n = 0 
which indicates 
fn + (z-s)f^ - ( z - r ) f fn = Wn + r w ^ (A26) 
Since w ^ = Wn = Wq, the above equation implies 
Wo = ( f n - s fm + r f ^ ) / ( l + r ) (All) 
which determines the employment level under a flat wage profile. Equation (A26) 
also implies 
r ( fm - Wo ) = Wo - ( fn - s fm). 
As fm > fn - sfi^i, it can be seen that 
fm > Wo > fn - s fi^ i 
This completes the proof. Notice that all the conclusions of Proposition 3 are 
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unchanged except the total employment level. Comparing equation {All) with 
(A 12) we see that whether the employment will increase or decrease when the quit 
rate is taken into considerations is indeterminate. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to study the role of hierarchical firms 
in some implicit contractual employment arrangements. It is now time for us to 
summarize the main conclusions. 
Chapter HI was primarily concerned with the function of information 
collection performed in hierarchical firms. A worker's ability is learnt by the 
firm after he stays with it for a period. This information is then used by the 
firm to decide his next-period job assignment/promotion. Two forces work 
together to result in a downward rigid wage profile : the transmission of 
information through job signalling and the possibility of quitting. In the case 
where there are only two possible levels of ability, the perceived high-ability 
worker's wage profile is stricdy upward, while the perceived low-ability 
worker may have a flat or steep wage profile. When the number of possible 
ability levels is greater than two there is the possibility of bunching : those 
workers perceived to have abilities lower than a critical level may receive the 
same wage. Since the new recruits use the hierarchical firm as a port of entry 
which unintentionally certifies their abilities, it is beneficial for the firm to use 
random assignment for their initial jobs and provide the same initial wage, 
whenever it is possible. With two career structures in the firm, it has, also 
been shown that high ability workers will have steep wage profiles whUe the 
low ability workers' wage profile may be flat or steep. In all cases the initial 
wage is less than the worker's expected average productivity. 
The imposition of supervision to prevent shirking in the hierarchical firm 
was the main concern of Chapter IV. An individual's probability of being 
caught shirking is inversely related to the total number of workers in the firm. 
In a two-state analysis we have shown that adding the non-shirking constraint in 
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the symmetric-information implicit contract model has significant effects on the 
conclusions. The well known optimal risk-sharing rule that the risk-neutral 
firm offers invariant wage income to the risk-averse worker does not necessarily 
hold, and the employment level does not meet the usual efficiency condition that 
marginal value product of labour equals wages either. This is because the 
degree of supervision faced by individual workers changes in different states, 
therefore, the corresponding optimal wages and employment levels are changed 
too. The model also denies one of the claims of implicit contract theory that 
layoffs are impossible when the worker's monetary valuation of unemployment 
(the sum of unemployment benefits from the government and monetary value of 
leisure) is zero, because that claim ignores the (implicit) cost of performing 
supervision incurred by the entrepreneur in the optimal contractual arrangement. 
The existence of supervision costs has a further implication that work sharing 
among workers is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of involuntary layoffs 
Chapter V considered the hierarchical firm as an internal labour market 
where junior workers and senior workers interact. The existence of the 
incumbent senior workers has two implications to the firm : skills can be 
transmitted to junior workers through their teaching, and their positions provide 
the junior workers with promotion prospects. Skill formation through "the 
seniors teach the juniors" has the implication that the worker's productivity 
profile is steep (the specification allows us to avoid relying on other 
explanations, e. g. incentive for work effort to increase productivity as in 
Lazear (1979)). It was showed that, even when the skills are and the 
firm is in a competitive labour market, the existence of mobility costs in 
recruiting the skilled workers will drive the firm's employment levels of both 
senior and junior workers away from the usual efficiency condition that wages 
equal marginal value product of labour. When the skills learnt from the firm are 
specific the prospect of internal promotion is important for an individual in 
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employment arrangements. In a two-period model we have shown that if the 
wage profile is upward sloping, then the worlcer has the risk of being not 
promoted after the training, and this results in a wage profile that steeper than 
the productivity profile. On the other hand, if the offered wage profile is flat, 
then the wage rate must equal the amount the worker can receive from an outside 
opportunity. In both cases the employment levels of junior and senior workers 
are not set at the standard efficiency level that wages equal marginal value 
products of labour. When recruiting the skilled workers from outside is 
allowed (the open internal labour market), the existence of adjustment costs 
and mobility costs affects the employment levels but leave the above conclusions 
unchanged. The same result applies when the quit rate is considered and treated 
exogenously in the model. The two-period model is then extended to a longer 
time horizon so that promotion may take place at any point of time after a worker 
has finished his training. It is now the waiting time for promotion and the 
training that cause the deviation of a worker's wage profile from his productivity 
profile. The former factor also affects the proportions of employees at different 
levels of the firm. 
As has been pointed out, in order to facilitate the analysis, each model 
developed in the thesis focused on certain functions performed in the 
hierarchical firms. In all cases, an important element, namely the strategic 
interaction between the superiors and the subordinates has been neglected. 
Rent seeking behaviour within the organization has also been assumed away. 
Some work has been done in these areas (seeMilgrom (1988), Tirole 
(1986)). The task of incorporating these elements in models like those of 
Chapters III, IV, and V, remains a challenge to be taken at a later stage. 
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